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## Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man

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### INTRODUCTION

IN CONSIDERING THE RELATIONS between phenomenology and the sciences of man, I do not think that I am approaching a mere scholastic problem which would be raised only by certain theses or opinions of a special philosophical school. Since its beginning, phenomenology has been attempting to solve a problem which is not the problem of a sect but, perhaps, the problem of our time. Since 1900 it has concerned us all, and it still concerns us all today. Husserl's philosophical endeavor is basically directed toward the simultaneous solution of a crisis in philosophy, a crisis in the sciences of man, and a crisis in science as such which we have not yet passed through.

The crisis in science is attested by the many studies devoted to the value of science from 1900 to 1905 in France (Poincaré, Duhem, LeRoy, and others). It was to be expected that Husserl, coming to philosophy from scientific disciplines (he began as a mathematician and his first work was a *Philosophy of Arithmetic*), should take very seriously this questioning of dogmatism

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concerning the foundations of geometry and physics. His desire to work out a new foundation for the sciences certainly weighed heavily in his decision to pursue a radical investigation in philosophy.

The sciences of man (psychology, sociology, history) also found themselves in a crisis situation. To the extent that it was really advancing, research in these fields was tending to show that all opinion, and in particular all philosophy, was the result of external psychological, social, and historical conditions working in combination. Psychology was tending toward "psychologism," as Husserl called it, sociology toward "sociologism," and history toward "historicism." But in the process they were undermining their own foundations. If, indeed, the guiding thoughts and principles of the mind at each moment are only the result of external causes which act upon it, then the reasons for my affirmation are not the true reasons for this affirmation. They are not so much reasons as causes working from the outside. Hence the postulates of the psychologist, the sociologist, and the historian are stricken with doubt by the results of their own researches.

So far as philosophy is concerned, under these conditions it loses any possible justification. How can one pretend as a philosopher that one is holding truths, even eternal truths, as long as it is clear that the different philosophies, when placed in the psychological, social, and historical frame where they belong, are only the expression of external causes? In order to practice philosophy, in order to distinguish between the true and the false, it is necessary for the philosopher to express not merely certain natural or historical conditions external to him but also a direct and internal contact of the mind with itself, an "intrinsic" truth which seems impossible so long as research in the field of the human sciences shows that at each moment this mind is externally conditioned.

The crisis of science in general, of the sciences of man, and of philosophy leads to an irrationalism. Reason itself appears to be the contingent product of certain external conditions. From the beginning of his career, Husserl recognized that the problem was to give a new account of how all three—philosophy, science, and the sciences of man—might be possible. It was necessary once again to think them through to their foundations. He saw that these different disciplines had entered into a state of permanent

crisis which would never be overcome unless one could show, by a new account of their mutual relations and their methods of knowing, not only how each alone might be possible but how all three might exist together. It must be shown that science is possible, that the sciences of man are possible, and that philosophy also is possible. The conflict between systematic philosophy and the advancing knowledge of science must cease.

Husserl raised this problem at the beginning of the century, and he raised it again at the end of his life in 1936 in the last work he partially published: *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften*.<sup>1</sup> This book is made up of lectures delivered at Belgrade during the last years of his life. The role of the philosopher is here defined in a very striking manner. The philosopher is, he says, "working in the service of humanity," meaning that the philosopher is professionally bound to the task of defining and clarifying the conditions which make humanity possible—that is, the participation of all men in a common truth.

The problem that we shall deal with is not a problem of the history of philosophy in a narrow sense. This would be a question of knowing just what phenomenologists have thought or think of psychology, and just what psychologists have thought or think of Husserl, Scheler, and Heidegger. It would be necessary to present the views of phenomenologists on psychology exactly as they have expressed them and, on the other side, the reactions of the psychologists to these phenomenological theses exactly as found in their writings. Such an enterprise would lead to very confusing results, for there have perhaps never been writers who were further from understanding one another. Most of the time phenomenologists have not understood what might be basically convergent with their own inspiration in contemporary psychology. We shall soon find an example of this in Husserl's criticisms of Gestalt psychology. And on their side the psychologists have been very deficient in their understanding of the phenomenologists.

1. First published in 1939 in Belgrade in Volume I of the journal *Philosophia*, this work has now been published as Volume VI in the *Husserliana* series, *Die Krisis der europäischen Wissenschaften und die transzendente Phänomenologie: Eine Einleitung in die phänomenologische Philosophie*, ed. Walter Biemel, 2d ed. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1962). English translation by David Carr, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology: An Introduction to Phenomenological Philosophy* (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1970).

For example, they almost constantly fall into the error of supposing that phenomenology wishes to lead them back to a psychology of introspection. Misunderstandings are so very frequent on both sides that we could never finish sorting them out.

We may grant that our question is indeed a historical question, but only on the condition that we understand by the "history of philosophy" a dialectical history. This means that we shall not develop the ideas of the phenomenologists merely according to the texts but according to their intentions. It is a question here not of an empirical history, which limits itself to the gathering of facts on the one hand and texts on the other, but rather of an "intentional history," as Husserl called it, which in a given assemblage of texts and works tries to discover their legitimate sense. We shall not restrain ourselves from explaining the phenomenological texts by considerations which are not found there in writing. It will even happen sometimes that certain discoveries of the psychologists will help us in interpreting them. Similarly psychology will not be interpreted merely from its express declarations. If one took a plebiscite among psychologists to find out what they think of phenomenologists, the result would be, without doubt, humiliating to the phenomenologists. But we shall seek to discover whether there is anything in the spontaneous development of psychology that is in convergence with the insights of phenomenology correctly understood. We shall not, therefore, restrict our attentions to psychologists who, rightly or wrongly, make some claim to phenomenological knowledge. Rather we shall consider the modern development of psychology and the conditions under which it has occurred. It is in the problems and difficulties it has encountered that we shall find both an influence of phenomenology and a harmony of two parallel investigations into common problems of the time.

In a broad sense our study will be historical. But the perspective on this history will be established by us and by the problems with which we are concerned. Our basic intention is, therefore, just as much systematic as it is historical. At the end, we shall attempt to reinterpret both the meaning of philosophical activity and the conditions underlying a psychology that is truly rigorous.

The history of philosophy can never be the simple transcription of what the philosophers have said or written. If this were the case, we would have to replace the historical manuals of philosophy with the complete works of all the philosophers. As a mat-

ter of fact, as soon as one approaches two texts and opposes to them a third, one begins to interpret and to distinguish what is really proper to the thought of Descartes, let us say, and, on the contrary, what is only accidental. Thus in Cartesianism, as it is defined by the texts, one begins to see an intention that the historian has taken the initiative in singling out, and this choice evidently depends on his own way of encountering the problems of philosophy. The history of philosophy cannot be separated from philosophy. There is, of course, a difference between reflection on texts and the purely arbitrary. But in interpreting these texts, we do not exceed the ordinary rights of the historian if we distinguish what our author has said from what we think he should have said. Let us now say only that the questions we pose to psychology and phenomenology are ours and that they have never been raised in the same words by the authors themselves.

#### [1] THE PROBLEM OF THE SCIENCES OF MAN ACCORDING TO HUSSERL

##### 1. *The problem of psychology and the problems of Husserl*

LET US first of all ask how Husserl, the founder of phenomenology in the modern sense, understood the sciences of man and their relation to his own research. We need to consider this, of course, not only at the beginning of his thought and in his earlier works but in the development of his philosophy and especially during the last ten years of his life.<sup>2</sup> In commenting on the last works of Husserl we shall indicate briefly how they are related to the investigations of Scheler and Heidegger, to which they are very near and yet from which they are at the same time very far.

Then we shall have to speak of the psychologists and sociologists who have expressly recognized their debt to phenomenology. Many are the psychologists who have done so—for example, Koffka, one of the three principal members of the school of Berlin, and Jaspers, who before becoming a philosopher pub-

2. Some of the works of this period have already been published, and the rest are in the process of being published, in the *Husserliana* series by the Husserl Archives of Louvain under the direction of H. L. Van Breda.



lished a general psychopathology. In this work he recognized expressly, by the very terms he used, the phenomenological origin of his conceptions. Binswanger, the Swiss psychologist and psychiatrist, explicitly states that his works have come forth under the simultaneous or successive influence of both Husserl and Heidegger.

Among us Minkowski has often spoken of the role played by Husserl and also by Heidegger in the formation of his thought. Last year at the Philosophical Institute he gave two lectures on phenomenology and existential analysis which have since been published in the journal *Evolution psychiatrique*.

But we shall not limit ourselves to those authors who have explicitly recognized a debt to phenomenology. We also wish to deal with a diffuse influence that was not always intended by Husserl or recognized by those who experienced it. All that was done in Germany from 1915 to 1920 under the direct or indirect influence of phenomenology was by no means accomplished exclusively in the courses of Husserl.

This diffuse influence was transported to the United States by Koffka, Köhler, Wertheimer, and Goldstein, and the same current is found to be at work there in the revision of behaviorism carried out by American psychologists.

Psychoanalysis, though in many respects it represents a very different mode of thought, has felt these phenomenological tendencies in its recent development. Nothing in the writings of Freud reveals the least knowledge of, or the least sympathy with, the phenomenological literature. But the exigencies of his own problems led him to a dynamic conception of psychoanalysis and elicited from Freud himself a revision of the theoretical framework which he had first used. One can see the joining of these two currents in a psychologist like Lewin, who was strongly influenced by phenomenology.

There will not be sufficient time to complete what we propose to do even concerning psychology. We must pass over the development of sociology, history, and linguistics, though it would be possible and useful to attempt this—perhaps as the subject matter for another course of lectures.

The man who philosophizes believes wrongly that when he thinks and affirms he is only expressing the mute contact of his thought with his thought. He is wrong to proceed as if he were not linked with the surrounding circumstances, for as soon as one

considers him from the outside, as the historian of philosophy already does, he appears to be conditioned by physiological, psychological, sociological, and historical causes. His thought appears therefore as a product with no intrinsic value, and what seems to him the pure adequation of his thought, appears to the external critic as a residual phenomenon or a mere result. From the standpoint of a psychologist, a sociologist, or a historian one could therefore conceive of a critique which would consist simply in relating the thought which is considered to its exterior conditioning. Instead of discussing the problems of philosophy by plunging into them, one would do much better to discredit philosophy in general by revealing the historical, social, and physiological conditions on which it depends.

But this process has the inconvenience of turning against the very person who employs it. If "psychologism" says to us that the philosopher and his thinking are only the marionettes either of psychological mechanisms or of an external history, one can always answer that the same holds true of *it*, and thus discredit this criticism. Thus if it is consistent, psychologism becomes a radical skepticism which is skeptical with respect to itself.

"Sociologism" is open to the same consequence. By showing that all our thinking is the expression of a social situation whose limitations prevent it from being *true*, one falls into the danger of proving too much, since sociologism also will bear no true meaning in itself. This can lead to political irrationalism and to political action without criteria. It was against these dangers, as we have seen, that Husserl decided to return to the task of philosopher: to restore certitude and the distinction of the true from the false.

His originality at this point was that he did not oppose psychologism and historicism by simply reaffirming the contrary position which he himself calls "logicism." This attitude admits that beyond the chain of psychological and social causes there is a special sphere, the place of thought in the strict sense of the term, where the philosopher may get in touch with an intrinsic truth. Elevating the sphere of thought in this way brings forth the return of psychologism and sociologism as soon as one perceives that philosophical thinking actually is not without roots.

From the beginning to the end of his career, Husserl tried to discover a way between logicism and psychologism. By a truly radical reflection, which reveals the prejudices established in us

by the external environment, he attempts to transform this automatic conditioning into a conscious conditioning. But he never denies that it exists and that it is constantly at work. He notes in a striking way that even philosophy descends into the flux of our experience and that it must itself flow on (*sich einströmen*). Even the thought which pretends to ignore the temporal flux or to dominate it takes place in this flux and descends into it as soon as it is constituted. The philosopher, in so far as he is a philosopher, ought not to think like the external man, the psychophysical subject who is *in* time, *in* space, *in* society, as an object is in a container. From the mere fact that he desires not only to exist but to exist with an understanding of what he does, it follows that he must suspend the affirmations which are implied in the given facts of his life. But to suspend them is not to deny them and even less to deny the link which binds us to the physical, social, and cultural world. It is on the contrary to *see* this link, to become conscious of it. It is "the phenomenological reduction" alone which reveals this ceaseless and implicit affirmation, this "setting of the world [*thèse du monde*]" which is presupposed at every moment of our thought.

What is peculiar to the philosopher is certainly that he considers his own life, so far as it is individual, temporal, and conditioned, as one possible life among many others. But then, by taking account of what it is actually, he may grasp what it might be, considering his own empirical personality as only one possibility in a much larger universe which needs to be explored. But this effort never permanently disregards our links with the physical and human world. We consider these spontaneous theses *ohne mitzumachen*—that is, without ourselves carrying them out at the very same moment. But this is the condition of all thought which claims to be true, and at the end of his career Husserl admitted that the first result of reflection is to bring us back into the presence of the world as we lived it before our reflection began (*Lebenswelt*).

The phenomenological reduction of the link, which is indeed a schism established by life between our thought and our physical and social situation, never leads us in any way to negate time or to pass beyond it into a realm of pure logic or pure thought. One never gets beyond time. Husserl says only that there are many ways of living time. On the one hand, there is the passive way, in which one is inside time and submits to it—being in time

(*Innerzeitigkeit*). On the other hand, one can take over this time and live it through for oneself. But in either case one is temporal and never gets beyond time. Philosophy has been traditionally regarded as the science of eternal truths. If we are to be exact, we should, rather, follow Husserl in the last years of his life and call it the science of the all-temporal, that which holds throughout all time, instead of a truth which would absolutely escape from the temporal order. This is a deepening of temporality. There is no passing beyond it.

Logic is not wrong in considering the laws of our thinking as universally valid. But we need to ask why they are universal and to see how Husserl justifies this. Logicism maintains that when I am concerned with a recognized law and affirm it unconditionally, I am communicating through the center of my being with a pre-personal thought. It founds the universality of logic, therefore, on an absolute right that is derived from its capacity to express the internal structure of the world as it is for a universal thinker. Even in his earliest works, Husserl's procedure of justification is very different. In the first part of the *Logical Investigations* he says that the laws of our thought are for us laws of being, not because we communicate with a pre-personal thought but rather because they are for us absolutely coextensive with everything that we can affirm.

If we wished to suppose other laws of a superhuman thought, either divine or angelic, then in order to find any meaning in these new principles, we would have to bring them under ours, so that to us they would be as nothing. We cannot conceive of them truly as thinkers, except in so far as they conform to the laws of our thought. An angel who would think in accordance with laws radically different from those governing human thought and who would thus cast doubt on these—this angel cannot be thought by me. Hence the universality of thought is not founded on any communication with a universal thinker, the center of all spirits, but simply on the fact that my thinking belongs to me. In order to be sure that a certain thought is a rule for all men and for all being, it is sufficient if I find that it concerns something truly essential, something which cannot be separated from me even in thought.

It is relevant to note here that Husserl goes so far as to say that even God could not have an experience of the world which would not present itself in the manner of our experience as a

series of always incomplete profiles.<sup>3</sup> This leads us, therefore, to a phenomenological positivism which refuses to found rationality, the agreement of minds, and universal logic on any right that is prior to fact. The universal value of our thinking has no justifiable foundation in anything independent of the facts. It is founded, rather, on a central and fundamental fact that I myself discover by reflection: the nonsense of anything that violates a principle of thought, such as the law of contradiction or other laws, for naturally the question remains open as to whether we may not arrive at a better formulation of the principles of true logic.

Husserl, therefore, never agreed with a certain philosophical tradition in holding that philosophy could be a system of definitive results never requiring reexamination with the advance of experience. For him philosophy is essentially progressive. As he says in his last years, it is an *infinite meditation*; and one of his better students, Eugen Fink, says that we are here involved in a "situation of dialogue." This means that as long as the philosopher remains within the realms of fact which limit his vision, he will never become a thinker who is universal in all respects. He is always situated and always individuated; this is why he is in need of dialogue. The surest way of breaking through these limits is to enter into communication with other situations—that is, other philosophers or other men. As Husserl stated in his last years, the last subjectivity, philosophical, ultimate, radical subjectivity, which philosophers call *transcendental*, is an *intersubjectivity*.

It is also stated in a passage of the "Nachwort" to the *Ideas*<sup>4</sup> that "philosophy is an idea." Husserl used the word "idea" here in the Kantian sense of a limiting concept to designate a thinking which we cannot properly think through, or totalize, which we envisage only on the horizon of our efforts as the limit of a certain number of thought operations which we are able to perform.

3. The idea of God is used here, as Husserl said in another place, not to introduce a theological affirmation, but as a philosophical index to place the situation of man in better relief.

4. Husserl's "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen*" was originally prepared as an "Author's Preface to the English Edition," i.e., to the translation by W. R. Boyce Gibson, *Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology* (New York: Humanities Press, 1931), pp. 11–33. The "Nachwort" was also published at the same time in German (see below, n. 8), and further references in the text are to the German edition.

"It is an idea which is realizable only in the style of a relative, provisional validity, and in a historical process without end, but which, under certain conditions, is also effectively realizable."<sup>5</sup>

We see, therefore, that what Husserl opposed to the crisis resulting from psychologism and sociologism is not the mere reaffirmation of the old philosophical dogmatism of eternal truths. The philosophical task to which he devoted himself was, rather, the establishment of an integral philosophy which would be compatible with the development of all the different investigations on the conditioning of man. During the whole career of Husserl, therefore, the struggle is on two fronts. On the one hand it is a struggle against psychologism and historicism, in so far as they reduce the life of man to a mere result of external conditions acting on him and see the philosophizing person as entirely determined from the outside, lacking any contact with his own thought and therefore destined to skepticism. But on the other hand, it is also a struggle against logicism, in so far as this is attempting to arrange for us an access to the truth lacking any contact with contingent experience. Husserl is seeking to reaffirm rationality at the level of experience, without sacrificing the vast variety that it includes and accepting all the processes of conditioning which psychology, sociology, and history reveal. It is a question of finding a method which will enable us to think at the same time of the externality which is the principle of the sciences of man and of the internality which is the condition of philosophy, of the contingencies without which there is no situation as well as of the rational certainty without which there is no knowledge.

In short, this enterprise is fairly close to that of Hegel, as is suggested by Husserl's use of the word "phenomenology." In Hegel's sense this is logic of content. Instead of a logical organization of the facts coming from a form that is superimposed upon them, the very content of these facts is supposed to order itself spontaneously in a way that is thinkable. A phenomenology, therefore, has a double purpose. It will gather together all the concrete experiences of man which are found in history—not only those of knowledge but also those of life and of civilization. But at the same time it must discover in this unrolling of facts a

5. Cf. *Ideas*, p. 28.

spontaneous order, a meaning, an intrinsic truth, an orientation of such a kind that the different events do not appear as a mere succession. For a conception of this kind one comes to the spirit only by "the spirit of the phenomenon"—that is, the visible spirit before us, not just the internal spirit which we grasp by reflection or by the *cogito*. This spirit is not only in us but spread far and wide in the events of history and in the human milieu. If it is true that Husserl sought by the study of phenomena to find the roots of reason in our experience, we should not be surprised that his phenomenology ended with the theory of a "reason hidden in history."

Only, with Hegel, phenomenology is merely a preface to logic, so that, at least according to certain interpreters, it is only the introduction to a philosophy which belongs to another order. But if it finally turns out to be a logic which is ruling over the development of the phenomena, the philosopher is doing just what Hegel warns against in his introduction to *The Phenomenology of Mind*. "He is putting himself in the place of consciousness itself, in making up his experiences." With Husserl, on the other hand, it is logic itself which becomes phenomenological. That is, he will not wish to give any other foundation to the affirmations of logic than our actual experience of truth.

For a philosopher of this kind, who desires to be integral, there is no question—as many of us, and above all many psychologists, have believed—of sacrificing science and in particular the science of psychology. On the contrary, Husserl thinks that the reform of psychology for which he is striving will lead to a new development then being retarded, in the psychologism of his time, by an inadequacy of methodological conceptions. In the *Ideas* he speaks of certain criticisms which implied that his investigations had been meant to replace psychological research. "I have protested against this conception," he says, "without any success, it seems." The explanations that

I have added have not been understood, and have been rejected without careful examination. Instead of answering the simple sense of my demonstration, this criticism of psychological methods has merely been dismissed. It never questioned the value of modern psychology. It never rejected the experimental work of eminent men. It pointed out certain radical weaknesses in method, in the literal sense of this word. In correcting them, psychology must be elevated, in my opinion, to a higher level of scientific certitude,

and must vastly enlarge its field of work. I shall add a few words elsewhere on the way in which psychology has been very inadequately defended against these supposed attacks of mine.<sup>6</sup>

Husserl, therefore, is not opposed to a scientific psychology. He simply believes that the existence and development of such a psychology raise certain philosophical problems, the solutions of which are relevant to psychology itself if it is to advance. In the light of the situation at the time when Husserl was writing, the problem was this: there seemed to be a conflict between the needs of philosophy, considered as pure rational interiority, and the needs of a psychology considered as the science of the external determination of human conduct.

How, then, does Husserl face this difficulty? He must find a way of knowing which is neither deductive nor purely empirical. This knowledge must not be purely conceptual in detaching itself from facts. Nevertheless it must be philosophical, or at least it must not make the existence of a philosophizing subject impossible. It is essential that our life should not be reduced exclusively to psychological events and that in and through these events there should be revealed a meaning which is irreducible to these particularities. This emergence of truth in and through the psychological event is what Husserl called *Wesensschau*, the intuition of essences.

In defending Husserl against the false interpretations that are so common, we must emphasize the concrete and familiar nature of this *Wesensschau*. It is a grasping of universal meanings in and through my contingent experience, which is not at all, as Husserl sees it, a peculiar, mystical operation that transports us beyond empirical facts. Thanks to its dual character, at the same time universal and concrete, this *Wesensschau* is capable of renewing and of developing psychology. For anyone who considers them from the outside, the experiences we live through, our *Erlebnisse*, as Husserl calls them, can certainly be socially and physically determined. Nevertheless there is a way of taking them through which they acquire a meaning that is universal, intersubjective, and absolute. But in pursuing this way, I must

6. *Ideen zu einer reinen Phänomenologie und phänomenologische Philosophie* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1928), p. 2. The translation in the text is based on Paul Ricoeur's translation, *Idées directrices pour une phénoménologie* (Paris: Gallimard, 1950), p. 4. Cf. *Ideas*, trans. Gibson, pp. 41-42.

not limit myself to living through the experience; I must grasp its sense, and this is the function of "eidetic intuition."

It is indeed a fact, a simple fact determined by external conditions, that I am going to such and such a concert today and that I am hearing the Ninth Symphony. But I am able to discover inside this experience, as I live it through, something which is independent of the factual conditions which have brought forth my decision. The Ninth Symphony is not enclosed within the time during which I am listening. It appears in the different performances of different orchestras. It is a cultural object which is brought forth under the baton of this director and through the playing of these violinists. But it cannot be reduced to any single performance that one gives of it. Hence if I succeed in bringing out of my experience all that it implies, in thematizing what I have lived through at this time, I come to something which is neither singular nor contingent—namely, the Ninth Symphony in its essence. This orientation of consciousness toward certain "intentional objects," which are open to an "eidetic" analysis, is what Husserl calls *intentionality*.

One can say that, by its antecedent conditions, my consciousness is bound to the contingent events which act on me. But in so far as it envisages certain terminations, in so far as it has a "teleology," in so far as it is concerned with certain cultural entities which are not divided by their different manifestations at different moments of my life or in different minds, it is open to a different kind of analysis. According to Husserl, the seeing of essences, or *Wesensschau*, is nothing but the clarification of the sense, or essence, toward which our consciousness is directed. He says in the *Ideas* that we should give neither a mystical nor even a Platonic meaning to the word *Wesensschau*. It does not involve the use of a super-sensible faculty absolutely strange to our experience and exercised only under exceptional conditions. *Wesensschau* is constant, he says, even in a life that conforms most closely to the natural attitude.

The insight into essences rests simply on the fact that in our experience we can distinguish *the fact that* we are living through something from *what it is* we are living through in this fact. It is by this vision that Husserl tries to find a way between psychologism and logicism and to bring forth a reform of psychology. In so far as the essence is to be grasped through a lived experience, it is concrete knowledge. But in so far as I grasp something

through this experience which is more than a contingent fact, an intelligible structure that imposes itself on me whenever I think of the intentional object in question, I gain another kind of knowledge. I am then not enclosed in the particularity of my individual life, and I attain an insight which holds for all men.

I get beyond my singularity not in so far as my consciousness is merely a series of facts or events but in so far as these events have a sense. The intuition of essences is simply a regaining of this sense, which is not thematized in our spontaneous, unreflective experience.

## [2] HUSSERL'S CONCEPTION OF AN EIDETIC PSYCHOLOGY

### 1. *The problem of eidetic psychology up to the Ideas*

IF ONE examines the *Philosophie der Arithmetik*,<sup>7</sup> the first work of Husserl, one must take account of the fact that at this moment the author had just left mathematics for philosophy. Having found the logicist conceptions of mathematics insufficient, he now proposed to found arithmetical operations on psychological acts, and he defined phenomenology as "descriptive psychology." Later on he renounced this conception because it led to psychologism, and interpreted basic notions of our thought—numbers, for example—as simple attributes of a psychological nature. In brief, he perceived at the beginning of his philosophical career that it was necessary to return to consciousness. One must look for the sense of mathematical concepts in the life of consciousness on which they rest.

But he did not understand this consciousness, to which he was returning as a philosopher, in the right way. He was opposing it to the world as one region to another. Later on he saw that this consciousness, on which the operations of logic are founded, is not merely a part of being but the source from which all being can receive its sense and its value of being for us. It is, in fact, the correlate of all being, whatever it may be. Mathematical being, for example, is an intentional correlate of consciousness, and so is the external world. Consciousness is, therefore, co-

7. *Philosophie der Arithmetik: Logische und psychologische Untersuchungen* (Halle: Pfeffer, 1891). Now published in *Husserliana XII*, ed. Lothar Eley (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970).

extensive with all being of which we can gain any knowledge. Nothing can have the value of being for us if it does not offer its sense to consciousness. The notion of consciousness is now generalized. It is no longer one being among others. It is, rather, the theater of all being and of the transcendental positing of any object.

One is here confronted with a philosophy that seems close to idealism. The formulae of the *Philosophie der Arithmetik* were insufficient because they were too psychological. On the other hand, the later formulae were too Platonic, in the vague and historically controversial sense that one ordinarily gives to this word. It is always between the Scylla of psychologism and the Charybdis of logicism that Husserl steers his course. Let us now define the position he took at the moment when he published the *Ideas*. The famous reduction, which gives us access to phenomenology, is not a mere return to the psychological subject. But even less does it turn our thought away from existence toward essences which would transcend it. This reduction is the decision not to suppress but to place in suspense, or out of action, all the spontaneous affirmations in which I live, not to deny them but rather to understand them and to make them explicit.

By his theory of the "phenomenological reduction" Husserl broke absolutely with every remnant of psychologism in his thought as well as with every remnant of Platonism in his early works. The philosophical I is going to withdraw from every condition of fact, as well as from every way of perceiving and understanding them, in order to leave nothing unnoticed. And the task of philosophy will then be to explain, with a complete lucidity, how both the manifestations of the external world and the realizations of the incarnate self are possible. Every intentional object refers to consciousness but to a consciousness which is not the incarnate individual that I am as a man, living at a certain moment of time and in a certain position in space. When I carry out the phenomenological reduction, I do not bring back information concerning an external world to a self that is regarded as a part of being, nor do I substitute an internal for an external perception. I attempt rather to reveal and to make explicit in me that pure source of all the meanings which constitute the world around me and my empirical self.

At this stage of his thinking what, then, was Husserl's view of the situation of psychology in relation to phenomenology?

Psychology, he said, is a science of fact. It is the science of man in the world, facing different situations and responding to them by different types of behavior. Hence it is certainly not to be confused with transcendental, phenomenological philosophy, which, as we have just explained, is a universal reflection that attempts to make explicit and to clarify conceptually all the intentional objects that my consciousness can envisage.

But precisely because it has its own proper region, psychology is not in the position of philosophy. The thesis of psychologism is precisely this: that psychology can take the place of philosophy. But this is impossible because psychology, together with common sense and the different sciences, shares in those convictions concerning being which need to be clarified by philosophy. All of us live in the natural attitude—that is, in the conviction that we are a part of the world and subject to its action on us, which we passively receive from the outside. Psychology accepts this realistic postulate from common sense, and sets up its problems from this point of view. The psychologist tries to see how man works out his responses to certain situations and stimuli, and to discover the laws which rigorously bind together such and such a group of stimuli with such and such a reaction. As Husserl saw it, this is perfectly legitimate, but it simply does not take the place of philosophy. We must not give an ontological value—that is, an ultimate weight—to this way of thinking, for it is naïve and unreflective.

If we actually reflect on our situation, we will find that the subject, thus situated in the world and submitting to its influences, is at the same time he who thinks the world. No world whatsoever is conceivable that is not thought by someone. Hence while it is true that the empirical subject is a part of the world, it is also true that the world is no more than an intentional object for the transcendental subject. Husserl defended this Copernican revolution, as Kant called it, which defined philosophy by its opposition to psychology up to the very end.

He consistently maintained that even a psychology which, like Gestalt psychology, recognizes that consciousness is unified and autonomous, that it is not made up of elements like an external thing, and that it is, rather, a whole whose parts have no separable existence is radically incapable of replacing philosophy. For even though the Gestaltists conceive of consciousness as a totality which cannot be dissolved into its elements, they never-

theless conceive of it as a natural totality existing in things. My consciousness, they would say, is a form more integrated than this lamp, but it is nevertheless only a form. As Husserl sees it, the very fact that one uses the same term "Gestalt" to designate the unity of consciousness and that of the lamp justifies the conclusion that Gestalt psychology naturalizes consciousness. It defines consciousness as other objects can be defined, and does not see that it is the subject for every possible object.

In his philosophical rigor, Husserl excludes both Gestalt psychology and that of nineteenth-century atomism and places them almost on the same level. Notice what he writes about this in his "Nachwort" to the *Ideas*: "Both atomistic psychology and Gestalt psychology remain in the same sense basically psychological naturalisms which, from their use of the expression 'internal sense,' can also be called sensualisms."<sup>8</sup> There is no difference here, in principle, between "atomistically" accumulating psychic data like grains of sand and considering them as parts of totalities held together by some empirical or a priori necessity, but nevertheless made up of such parts. There is no essential difference between saying with the associationists, "Consciousness is a sum of sensations and images," and with the Gestaltists, "Consciousness is a totality in which the elements have only an inseparable existence." So long as one does not radically reform the notion of totality so as to think of consciousness as a totality with no equivalent at all among the things of nature, one is still trapped in naturalism and psychologism.

Husserl maintained this up to the very end. He never thought that psychology would be able to take the place of philosophy, even a highly refined psychology having nothing to do with any atomism or with any reduction to elements of any kind. But he held something even more than this. Not only will psychology never take the place of philosophy, but as psychology it necessarily involves a deformation of consciousness.

As a matter of fact, it shares in the natural attitude which indeed enables it to consider man, but only as a part of the world. When a psychologist speaks of consciousness, the mode of being he attributes to it does not differ radically from that of things. Consciousness is an object to be studied, and the psychologist

8. "Nachwort zu meinen *Ideen* . . ." *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*, XI (1930), 565; cf. *Ideas*, p. 24.

sees it among other things as an event in this system of the world. To arrive at a conception which will do justice to the radical originality of consciousness, we need an analysis of a very different type, which will find in our experience the meaning, or the essence, of every possible psyche. We will never really find out what consciousness is unless we grasp this internal meaning in ourselves and gain an eidetic intuition of it.

Consciousness is accessible only to intentional analysis and not to mere factual observation. The psychologist always tends to make consciousness into just such an object of observation. But all the factual truths to which psychology has access can be applied to the concrete subject only after a philosophical correction. Psychology, like physics and the other sciences of nature, uses the method of induction, which starts from facts and then assembles them. But it is very evident that this induction will remain blind if we do not know in some other way, and indeed from the inside of consciousness itself, what this induction is dealing with.

In order to understand truly what has been discovered about man, we must, therefore, combine induction with the reflective knowledge that we can obtain from ourselves as conscious subjects. This is what Husserl called *eidetic psychology*—that is, a reflective effort by which we clarify the fundamental notions which psychology uses constantly, through a contact with our own experience. According to Husserl, empirical psychology must be preceded by an eidetic psychology. The knowledge of facts belongs to psychology. But the definition of the notions which will enable us to understand these facts belongs to phenomenology.

We may take certain concepts, like image and perception, from common usage and then apply them without careful attention in interpreting psychological facts. But in so far as we have not given a coherent and adequate sense to these notions by reflecting on our experiences and perceptions, we will not know what they mean and what the facts concerning image and perception really show.

In general, Husserl thinks neither that psychology will be replaced by philosophy nor that philosophy will be replaced by psychology. It is essential that each should maintain its autonomy. To psychology is allotted the investigation of facts, and the relations of these facts. But the ultimate meaning of these facts

and relations will be worked out only by an eidetic phenomenology which focuses the essence of perception, of image, and of consciousness itself.

## 2. *An illustration from the earlier works of Sartre*

The first works of Sartre on imagination and emotion illustrate very well Husserl's conception as it was presented in the middle period of his career.

At the end of his essay on the imagination,<sup>9</sup> Sartre shows that in so far as we have not reflected on what an image is, all the experimental investigations that we can make remain a dead letter. Of course they give us results that are ultimately quantitative in character. But we do not know what these results mean or what it is that has been measured. For example, one sees under what conditions the image is presented. One finds that in our conscious life it corresponds to states of low tension and that it appears almost instantaneously without definite contours. One speaks of clear images, and shows that they are not, as is often believed, complete pictures of the objects they represent but only schematic outlines. One shows again that the image is never altogether self-sufficient in our conscious life and that it serves only to resume a certain project of thought or to carry symbolic references to certain objects.

All this is true. But it does not enable us to understand what the image is, how it enters into relation with a thought that uses it, and what the predominance of imaginary life means for a given subject. As long as we regard the image as a little frozen picture in consciousness, it is impossible for us to understand how this image-thing can enter into any real relation with active thought. It remains simply a sensible thing, veiled or suppressed or less complete. This conception of the image, which has no scientific value, introduces fixed elements into psychological analysis which do not belong there but which are derived rather from prescientific common sense. The same thing can also happen in a phenomenological clarification. One often does not understand what it is to imagine something and what purpose this may serve. What is the sense of imagining attitudes and be-

9. Jean-Paul Sartre, *L'Imagination* (Paris: Alcan, 1936); English translation by Forrest Williams, *Imagination: A Psychological Critique* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1962).

havior? What does an act of imagining mean in the life of man?

To answer these questions we need an analysis which would show us that, in principle, the image is not something observable, though it pretends to be—that it is, in short, essentially deceptive. We all believe that images are observable like the things we sense. But when we try to observe them, we find that this is impossible and that, as Alain says, we cannot count the columns of the Pantheon in our images of it. The image is, therefore, a claim to the presence of the imagined object which is unfounded. It is an absence of the object which tries to pass as its presence. It calls up an object, as one speaks of calling up a spirit. The thinking self is referring to such and such a real object existing in the world, with the pretense of making it appear here and now just where I am. As Sartre says, there are not two Peters, one who is real and in West Africa and another Peter in my consciousness. In reality, there is my reference to the real Peter, with the pretense that I am making him appear here in my mental equipment. This kind of incorporation of something absent in present data is carried out naturally with the aid of certain perceptual elements which serve as analogues of the absent object. This is sufficient to show that in reality the image is not a content in my consciousness but rather an operation of my whole consciousness. To perceive oneself as imagining is to set up a certain kind of relation with the absent thing.

Understood in this way, the image can be compared to a whole series of other phenomena. For example, one can compare the awareness of a mental image of the Pantheon with an awareness of certain photographic images. Thus there is no essential difference between my awareness of the absent Pantheon and that which I have of a photograph under my eyes. When the object is totally absent without a representative, I make use of certain elements in my present perception which are analogues. To imagine is always to make something absent appear in the present, to give a magical quasi presence to an object that is not there. On this basis one may then investigate how the subject achieves this incantation of an absent visage in the present data of his perceptions. One will see that he must impress them with a physiognomy or a structure of some kind that he then projects actively by his motor-affective attitude. Such an eidetic analysis of the image will make possible experimental approaches which are no longer blind, because they will know something of what

they are talking about and will understand the connection of the image with our motor-affective life.

In the same way, before we have worked out an eidetic psychology of emotion and before we have asked ourselves what it is to be emotionally moved, we may raise the problem of emotion in a very confused way, because we see it through a number of prejudices and prenotions which artificially separate the facts. Common sense, for example, will say of emotion that it involves two separate orders of fact, "corporeal manifestations" on the one hand and "representations" on the other. The question was raised in this way at the time of William James. One school then maintained that emotion must be understood from the standpoint of representations, while another defended the standpoint of corporeal facts.

Hence psychology held that a great victory had been won on the day when James reversed the traditional order in saying "I am sorry because I weep" instead of "I weep because I am sorry." Psychology still indulged in this type of speculation even after the coming of phenomenology and proposals to work out meaningful clarifications of emotion. But this does not involve any opposing of concepts to facts. It is a question, rather, of replacing habitual concepts, to which we pay no careful attention, by concepts which are consciously clarified and are therefore far less likely to remove us from experience as it is lived.

In connection with emotion, eidetic reflection will ask: after all, what is it to be moved; what is the meaning of emotion? Can one conceive of a consciousness which is incapable of emotion, and if not, why not? One will understand emotion as a total act of consciousness, as a mode of our relation to the entire world, and one will seek to determine its sense.

In earlier times psychology noted vaguely that emotion was both a "psychic" and a "physical" state and sought to determine which was the cause of the other. Phenomenology will remain neutral before this issue, and without assuming that emotion is either psychical or physical it will simply ask what emotion means and toward what it is tending.

Many psychologists have sketched out research of this kind. It will be a constant thesis of the following lectures that one does not have to be specially tutored by Husserl to discover psychological developments that are moving in a phenomenological direction. Janet, for example, raised the question of emotion in a

very new way when he tried to find out what was the meaning of a given emotion. In a passage in *De l'angoisse à l'extase*<sup>10</sup> he brought up the case of a young girl who came to consult him but refused to answer his questions. She ended by falling into a nervous crisis which naturally made it impossible for her to do this. The emotion, the nervous breakdown, and the anger had a sense. They were a way of avoiding the interrogatory situation which the girl had instinctively accepted in coming to see Janet but which she had not really decided to undertake.

In the same way Freud considered emotion as an action or realization which is symbolic. In one of his formulae, clearly showing the relation between his whole enterprise and that of the phenomenologists, he also maintained that "psychic facts have a sense" which must be deciphered. He tried to place them in the total life of the subject, the dynamics of his behavior, and thus to show what they mean.

According to Sartre, for example, emotion is the modification of our relation to the world when we abandon an ordered way of acting which takes account of causality, and change over to an immediate, magical, and fictitious transformation of the situation. Thus a man in a fit of anger will stop trying to untie the knot of a string or a shoelace and will suddenly tear it apart, which does not resolve the problem of the knot but simply suppresses it. An orderly way of relating to the object and the world is replaced by an irrational way in which everything happens as if the unconditional will of the subject were able to reach its result by merely projecting itself into the object without any employment of means. This is an example of what Husserl calls an eidetic analysis. One gathers together the lived facts involving emotion and tries to subsume them under one essential meaning in order to find the same conduct in all of them.<sup>11</sup>

Thus we may say, in using a formula of Husserl, that the relation of psychology to phenomenology is analogous to that of physics to geometry. In relation to methodological questions, psychology refers to phenomenology. For example, to know what an emotion is and how to approach it by way of the body or the

10. Pierre Janet, *De l'angoisse à l'extase* (Paris: Alcan, 1926-28).

11. This kind of investigation of essence is at the same time an analysis of existence in the modern sense of the word, or at least leads toward this, since the essence of an experience is always a certain modality of our relation to the world.

spirit, or in a neutral phenomenological way, we need a clarification of the internal meaning of the phenomenon, which phenomenology can furnish. This does not mean that the work of the phenomenologist replaces that of the psychologist, any more than that of the geometer replaces that of the physicist. Geometry and mathematics in general were necessary preconditions for the development of a physics. But this does not mean that they can take its place.

In another passage Husserl says that the relation between empirical and eidetic psychology is the same as that between sociology and statistics. This means that statistics is necessary to sociology but does not coincide with it. We must get into contact with the social phenomenon, and understand it in its own proper frame, in order to find a social meaning in statistical facts. In the same way it is necessary to get into contact with the psyche by phenomenological reflection in order to understand the results of the empirical investigations of psychology.

In conclusion, Husserl believed that he saw in the psychological investigations of his time many uncertainties which are connected with the desire to use scientific techniques. Psychology rightly seeks to gain a factual knowledge which one obtains only through contact with a number of different instances of the phenomenon studied, not previously imaginable by us and therefore to be found only in experience. But the psychologist believes that it is sufficient merely to note down these facts in order to understand them. The result is that he examines them in a state of relative blindness and that in interpreting them he uses confused concepts taken from our prescientific experience.

From time to time, for example, the psychologist uses the concept of man, if only to mark off animal from human psychology. But what, more exactly, is the meaning of this notion of man? Since it is drawn from our common sense, perhaps it needs to be revised. Perhaps it is too broad, so that certain beings we commonly call men do not really merit the name in terms of a strict analysis. In any case, this needs to be examined. Or perhaps, on the contrary, our notion of man is too narrow. If we were to examine the chimpanzee more carefully, we might discover that there is no justifiable reason for excluding him from the class of animals known as men. Our present concept of man is not at all scientific. It is vague, confused, and in need of psychological clarification.

Phenomenological analysis is a clarifying effort of this kind. It is seeking to identify with rigor, and to link together in an intelligible way, the attitudes and traits that may justifiably be called human. One may say that "psychology will of course be able to define man, but only at the end of its inquiry." Still, this is not certain, since the investigation will be concerned with facts. Will it reveal merely certain characteristics which belong to the collection of individuals that one ordinarily calls "man," or will it show that these characteristics do not belong to all, or that they also belong to other individuals not usually called human? Such a factual investigation will never enable us to decide whether the collection of traits obtained in this way deserves to constitute a definition. Are they essential or only accidental? Sooner or later this investigation of the essence with which an eidetic psychology is concerned should be undertaken. But it will never come to anything so long as the traits accepted for empirical investigation are chosen only because of their frequent occurrence and have no power to reveal the essence that must be understood.

### 3. *Difficulties involved in a subordination of psychology: the interconnections of psychology and phenomenology*

To this conception of an eidetic psychology two kinds of objection can be made and, as a matter of fact, have been made. First, we may easily go astray, since this kind of psychology rests on a misunderstanding. The second objection goes much further. It was seen by Husserl himself, and led him to alter his ideas and to develop his doctrines beyond the stage of the *Ideas*.

The first objection maintains that an eidetic psychology would be merely a return to introspection and would therefore lead to all the difficulties from which psychology attempted to escape when it decided to become a science.

On this point no confusion is possible. For Husserl the discovery of the essence, or the meaning, of a process certainly involves a power of reflection, the ability to find the sense of what is lived through by oneself or by another. At the period of the *Ideas* he thought that reflective consciousness can arrive at an evidence concerning itself which is absolutely final and that in it what appears and what is are not distinct. In this sense Husserl held that consciousness, or *cogito*, is incomparable with external

things. These external things appear in successive experiences through different perspectives, or *Abschattungen*. If consciousness were external to itself there would be no certitude nor science concerning it. In this sense, it is true to say that for Husserl, as for all the Cartesians, the existence of consciousness is inseparable from the consciousness of existing and that consequently the consciousness I need to know is the subject that I am. It is also clear, finally, that Husserl wishes to use this proximity of myself to myself, and more generally of man to man, in defining the *cogito* and reflection. In order that knowledge may be possible, I must not be cut off from myself and from the other.

But this does not mean that the internal relation of myself to myself and to the other is already scientific knowledge and that reflective psychology is introspective. This introspection is supposed to consist in the presence of data internal to the subject, which he observes and which are revealed to him by the mere fact that they are "in him." This is an internal perception, the noting of an event with which I coincide. But reflection is not at all the noting of a fact. It is, rather, an attempt to understand. It is not the passive attitude of a subject who watches himself live but rather the active effort of a subject who grasps the meaning of his experience. Husserl was so far from making internal perception into a principle that he granted a greater certitude, in certain respects, to external perception than to internal observation. *Reflection on the meaning or the essence of what we live through is neutral to the distinction between internal and external experience.*

It is rather a question of explaining what these phrases mean. In particular, nothing prevents my phenomenological reflection from having a bearing, for example, on another person, since I perceive him and his modes of behavior. Nothing prevents the clarification of the intentions or meanings or ways of acting from referring not only to my own conduct but to that of another whom I witness. Nothing prevents me from explaining the meaning of the lived experience of another person, in so far as I have access to it, by perception. According to Husserl, "Pure internal psychology, the authentic psychology of intentionality, is, in the last analysis, a psychology of pure intersubjectivity." This pure internal psychology is not restricted to the subject in himself. It

grasps just as well the relations of different subjects to each other—i.e., intersubjectivity.

Internal observation is related to the empirical self. But Husserlian reflection is related to a transcendental subject which is prepersonal, and neutral with respect to the distinction between the empirical self and the other. In fact, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, he uses the notion of conduct, *Gebaren*, to introduce his discussion of the perceiving of another. Behavioristic psychology, therefore, offers no difficulties for an eidetic method. Eidetic insight applies just as well to the experience of another, because my experience and his are interrelated in my dealings with him (by "intentional transgression," as the *Cartesian Meditations* say). In a very early article of 1910 Husserl also said that the intersubjective determination of individual psychisms is possible.

Of this first objection, then, let us retain only the notions which Husserl left unclarified, at the time of the *Ideas*, concerning the relation between radical reflection—founded on the fact that I am no stranger to myself (Heidegger would say that I am not hidden from myself)—and that other awareness of myself which is not immediate and is capable of error as well as truth. This leads us now to the second objection, which is more interesting, since it penetrates to the heart of the matter. It will lead us to complete what we have said up to this point, just as it led Husserl himself to deepen his thought. Is it not true that an eidetic psychology, reflectively determining the basic categories of psychic life by reflecting on my experience of myself and the other, reduces psychology, in the narrower sense, to a very restricted role? Is it not, then, limited to a mere study of details?

In his earlier works Husserl went so far as to say at certain points that the relation of psychology to philosophy is almost that of content to form. It is philosophy that knows what space is. It is from psychology, on the other hand, that I gain some information concerning the perception of space through certain visual and tactual contents of experience. If one clings to formulae of this kind, everything essential seems to be furnished by phenomenology, or philosophic insight. Nothing more is left to psychology than to study certain empirical curiosities within the frames that are furnished by phenomenology.

In other texts Husserl wrote as if psychology ought to concern itself with causal relations, laws of fact through which the

phenomena actually belonging to the province of philosophy are manifested. Psychology studies a consciousness which is introduced into the body and naturalized. It should concern itself only with those conditions of existence, or of the temporal order, in which certain aspects of the phenomenon, or essence, appear. But the description and comprehension of the phenomenon itself fall to phenomenology. Since the order of essences has its own certainties, these transcendental relations can never be denied by the order of psychological genesis which is concerned only with a special application. Is this really all that Husserl thought about the question? After all, the notion of *Wesensschau* was developed to found an activity of consciousness which would be concrete as well as philosophical, both linked to my experience as well as capable of universality. Does the conception of noetic insight, such as Husserl had developed it up to this point, correspond to these two conditions?

This question was not resolved in a satisfactory manner at the period of the *Ideas*, the work on which I have been so far commenting. But in the later works we can see a further effort to resolve it.

At the beginning of his career Husserl considered all questions concerning psychological genesis as secondary. They could in no case prevail against the philosophical problems concerning essence. But as his thought matured, he gave a meaning to genesis which was very different and much more positive—to such a degree, indeed, that in the *Cartesian Meditations* he speaks of a phenomenology of genesis.

If in Husserl's view the knowledge of facts is impossible without some insight into essence and is always helped by this, it follows that all sound knowledge of facts must include, at least implicitly, some insight into essences, and that Husserl must admit, as he does in effect, that those psychologists who have been preoccupied with facts have nevertheless been able to find out something concerning essences. The division of labor between eidetic and empirical psychology turns out to be extremely difficult, since as soon as one engages in even the most experimental type of psychological research, in so far as he says anything sound and true, some insight into essence is implied by his work.

Husserl himself pointed out an analogy between what has happened in physics and what has happened in psychology. The

physicists who created physics, in the modern sense of the word, had an insight into what a physical thing is. Galileo, for example, of whom Husserl often spoke, was certainly not a phenomenologist. He was not even a philosopher in any strict sense of the word. Nevertheless when he decided to study falling bodies, a certain intuition of what a physical body is was implied in this experimental investigation. Spatial determination, for example, was regarded as altogether fundamental. And when, after Galileo, other physicists added to our knowledge of nature, one can say that each of them contributed to the development of an *eidetic of physical things*. Husserl was not interested in making the knowledge of essences an exclusive privilege of phenomenologists. These are implied in all experimental research, and they appear there whether one is looking for them or not and whether one wants them or not.

But more needs to be said. It is not only true that a knowledge of facts always implies a knowledge of essences, but in addition to the factual link between the two psychologies, we are going to see that there is a much closer connection. In order to make this more precise, let us turn for a moment to the nature of the *Wesensschau*. We must remember that for Husserl this has the nature of a finding (constatation). He often speaks of an "eidetic constatation." We must also remember that he never envisaged an a priori, in the sense of a deductive psychology. He says in the *Ideas* that there is no "mathematics of phenomena," no "geometry of the lived."<sup>12</sup> Why not? Because eidetic, or phenomenological, psychology, in distinction from mathematics, is a science which is essentially descriptive. The multiplicities with which geometry is concerned are "mathematical multiplicities," which can be exhaustively defined—that is, by a system of axioms. But in phenomenology there is no question of defining the objects of psychology by any system of axioms which would enable us to construct these different psychical realities.

This is because the essences we may discover, when we force ourselves to think about lived experiences, are not, in Husserl's terms, "exact essences" capable of an univocal determination. They are, rather, "morphological essences," which are inexact by nature. Husserl says in the *Ideas* that if one were to dream of a phenomenological psychology which would be deductive, he

12. Cf. *Ideas*, trans. Gibson, pp. 67, 185.

would fall into the same sort of difficulty as a geometer who, for example, might dream of giving a rigorous geometrical definition of terms such as "jagged," "notched like a lentil," or "like a sunshade."<sup>13</sup>

There is no geometric definition of these forms, and it is equally impossible to give any constructive definition of the different realities with which psychology is concerned. It is through experience alone that they can be known, and not otherwise. From the very beginning, therefore, it has been necessary to maintain a close relation between eidetic intuition and that which we do, in fact, experience.

Husserl often says that to see an essence one must begin by having a perception, which serves as the base, or point of departure, for a *Wesensschau* but not as the source of its validity. The relation between perception and *Wesensschau* is one of founding (*Fundierung*); perception, that is, serves as the ground, or pedestal, on which an insight into essence is formed. Thus insight into essence is an intellectual taking over, a making explicit and clarifying of something concretely experienced; and a recognition that it comes after something else, from which it starts, is essential to its nature. It also knows itself to be retrospective. The idea that it succeeds a more direct contact with the thing itself is enclosed within its very meaning.

One sees already in Husserl the idea of a double envelopment. It is true that reflective thought, which determines the meaning or essence, ends by possessing its object and enveloping it. But it is also true that essential insight always understands the concrete perception of experience as something here and now which precedes and therefore envelops it. In Husserl's words, the essence presupposes "an important part of intuition" bearing on the individual. It presupposes that an individual has appeared and that one has had a view of it. It also presupposes the *Sichtlichkeit*, the visibility of this individual. Or, to put it in another way, it is no insight into an essence if one's reflection cannot turn to a corresponding individual, if one cannot work out "a sense of examples" to illustrate his insight.

*What, then, exactly is the relation between this sense of examples and what is called induction?* It is in working out an answer to this question that we may be able to understand the

13. Cf. *ibid.*, p. 208.

relation between phenomenological and empirical, or inductive, psychology.

We must here recall the profound remarks of Husserl on induction in general. These were basically opposed to the theory of induction which held sway at the end of the nineteenth century, essentially that of Mill. According to this theory induction is a process by which, in considering a group of facts, we discover a common character and set it apart by abstraction, regarding it as essential to the group of facts from which we started. Or again, induction is an operation which enables us to find the cause of a phenomenon among its various antecedents, by discarding those which are neither constant nor unconditioned. According to Husserl, induction is not, and never has been, this. His remarks here anticipate those of Brunschwig in his *L'Expérience humaine et la causalité physique*.

Let us return to the example of Galileo and the fundamental induction which, we may say, created modern physics. How does Galileo proceed? Does he consider different examples of falling bodies and then, by a method of agreement, following the theory of John Stuart Mill, abstract what is common to these examples? As a matter of fact, he proceeds in a totally different manner. The conception of the fall of bodies which guides his experiment is not found in the facts. He forms it actively; he constructs it. He freely conceives the pure case of a freely falling body, of which there is no given example in our human experience. Then, having constructed this idea, he verifies it by showing how the confused empirical facts, which never represent the free fall in its pure state, can then be understood through the introduction of additional conditions (friction, resistance, etc. . . .), which explain the difference between the facts and the pure concept. On the basis of the free fall, therefore, one constructs the fall of a body on an inclined plane.

Husserl says in the first volume of the *Logical Investigations* that the physicists proceed by "*idealiserende Fiktionen cum fundamento in re*"—that is, by idealizing fictions which are nevertheless founded on the facts. Let it be, he says, the law of Newton. Basically it makes no assertion about the existence of gravitating masses. It is another one of those idealizing fictions by which one purely conceives of what a gravitating mass would be. Then one determines what properties it would have, on the supposition that it exists. According to Husserl, Newton's law

says nothing at all about existence. It refers only to what would belong to a gravitating mass as such.<sup>14</sup>

The method actually used by physicists, therefore, is not the chimerical induction of Mill, which is never practiced in the sciences. It is rather *a reading of the essence*. Through certain impure and imperfect phenomena, such as the fall of a body on an inclined plane, I read off the free fall of the body, which is theoretically conceived, or forged, by the intellect. That which gives its probable value to the induction and which finally shows that it is truly founded on things is not the number of facts invoked to justify it. No! It is rather the intrinsic clarity which these ideas shed on the phenomena we seek to understand. Just as Brunswicg will show, in his *L'Expérience humaine et la causalité physique*, that one experiment will suffice to establish a law—that Davy, for example, established the existence of potassium by only one experiment of electrolysis—so Husserl maintained that induction is not founded on the collection of a vast number of cases. It is, rather, a process of intellectual analysis whose verification consists in the total, or at least sufficient, clarity which the group of concepts worked out in this way brings to the given phenomena. Thus laws are not basically live realities which would have a *force* and could rule over the facts. One should say, rather, in the language of Malebranche, that they are a light and not a force.

Let us now compare induction, understood in this way, with the phenomenological *Wesensschau*. This intuition of essences, like induction, as we have seen, is based on facts. The difference is that *Wesensschau* is based on the *imaginary "free variation" of certain facts*. In order to grasp an essence, we consider a concrete experience, and then we make it change in our thought, trying to imagine it as effectively modified in all respects. *That which remains invariable* through these changes is the essence of the phenomena in question.

For example, if we are seeking to form an idea of, or to understand the essence of, a spatial figure, such as this lamp, we must first perceive it. Then we will imagine all the aspects contained in this figure as changed. That which cannot be varied without

14. "Prolegomena zur reinen Logik," *Logische Untersuchungen*, 2 vols. (Halle: Niemeyer, 1913), I, 150; cf. English translation by J. N. Findlay, "Prolegomena to Pure Logic," *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols. (New York: Humanities Press, 1970), I, 106.

the object itself disappearing is the essence. Suppose that we wish to form the idea of melody. We recall a tune which we have learned to sing, and suppose that all the notes and all the relations between the notes are changed. That which remains invariable and without which there would be no more melody is the essence we are seeking. In the same way, if we are trying to conceive the essence of a "social process," we will represent to ourselves a social process in which we have participated or concerning which we have some historical understanding. That which does not vary through all conceivable variations will be the essence. Even when one thinks in terms of the pure essence, one always thinks of the visible—the fact. But in the case of *Wesensschau*, the individual fact is neither grasped nor assumed as a reality, which is shown by the fact that we subject it to an imaginary variation.

We are thus led to the following conclusion: If eidetic psychology is a reading of the invariable structure of our experience based on examples, the empirical psychology which uses induction is also a reading of the essential structure of a multiplicity of cases. But the cases here are real and not imaginary. After closer examination, the only difference which we find between inductive procedure—so far as it is justifiable and moves toward what is truly essential—and the procedure of eidetic psychology is that the latter applies imaginary variation to its examples, while the former refers to effective variations in considering the different cases that are *actually realized*.

If we reflect further, we may see that the relation between the two is even closer. For when you make an induction on the basis of facts which are very large in number, you do not examine every possible, individual case. For example, when you establish the law of a physical phenomenon, you are not going to verify the law by every possible value of each variable. You will limit yourself to a finite number of experiments, and you will then single out one relation that you consider to be always true, even for the intermediate values between those that you have verified. This is called "interpolating," and it requires the use of that free variation of which Husserl spoke—at least in the intervals between the values effectively verified. In a certain number of decisive experiments you perceive certain relations, and you imagine the rest in function of these relations which are actually perceived in a finite number of cases. You link together

the different examples effectively perceived by an imaginary variation which will lead from one to the other.

Let us now turn to an example from psychology, not physics: the important and interesting notion, now widely used, of behavioral lability or instability. How does one arrive at a notion of this sort? One says that a type of behavior is labile either when it is reproduced without any change under very different conditions—that is, when it is not flexible—or when it changes or disappears in a way that is wholly unpredictable. One calls an attitude labile both when it is too rigid and when it is not rigid enough. In using this notion, one therefore identifies the two extreme cases—excessive fixity on the one hand and too frequent change on the other. How is this possible? How does one arrive inductively at such a psychological notion? It is certainly not by any comparison of the given characters of psychological facts. One could compare the relevant psychological facts as much as one wishes without finding anything held in common. What is there in common between a stereotyped mode of conduct and one that is ever ready to disappear? Nothing, certainly, that is given with the facts. The notion of lability is constructed.

Goldstein introduced it with reference to what he called centered or non-centered behavior. The common element in extremely automatic behavior, on the one hand, and ephemeral behavior, on the other, is that neither of them is centered in the whole conduct of the individual. The lack of centering is the meaning held in common by modes of behavior which are absolutely episodic and others which are invariable and monotonous. In both of them we see that the connection between the situation and the response is wholly external, so that the situation does not guide the response. The construction of a concept of this kind is very close to Husserl's *Wesensschau*. This is doubtless why he says so often that everyone performs the *Wesensschau*. "The intuition of essences does not involve any more difficulties or 'mystical' secrets than perception."<sup>15</sup>

This *Wesensschau* is not the exclusive possession of the phenomenologists. As a matter of fact, Husserl says in the *Ideas* that "everyone is constantly seeing ideas or essences, and every-

15. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," *Logos*, I (1910), 289; cf. English translation by Quentin Lauer, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in Quentin Lauer, ed. and trans., *Edmund Husserl: Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy* (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), p. 110.

one uses them in the operations of thought, in spite of the widespread opposition put forth in the name of points of view in the theory of knowledge."<sup>16</sup> The empiricist theory of induction is one of these points of view (in the pejorative sense of this phrase), a vague opinion without rigor, which prevents us from seeing ourselves when we practice the *Wesensschau*, especially in making inductions.

In presenting the matter as I have, I am pushing Husserl further than he wished to go himself. He never expressly recognized the fundamental homogeneity of these two modes of knowledge, the inductive and the essential. He never admitted that in the last analysis they were indiscernible and simply differed in degree. Nevertheless his notion of an experienced essence, or an eidetic experience, contains in germ the consequence that I have just drawn from it. But it is a question here not so much of a consequence as of an inevitable dialectic of the concept of essence. It follows on principle from Husserl's point of departure and from what he proposed to do—namely, to show that this knowledge of essences is altogether experiential, that it does not involve any kind of supersensible faculty, and that in the last analysis the essence is just as contingent as the fact. It also follows inversely, from Husserl's point of departure and from the problem we have formulated in the preceding lectures, that any knowledge of fact always involves an a priori understanding of essence.

Instead of clearly recognizing the homogeneity of the two modes of knowledge, Husserl was content to insist, as he did very often, on the parallelism between psychology and phenomenology. "As a matter of principle," he said, psychology in its whole development is parallel to phenomenology. Of course, one might just as well say that phenomenology is always parallel to psychology and that every significant proposition of empirical psychology anticipates a phenomenological truth. As a matter of fact, Husserl did say that "every empirical discovery as well as every eidetic discovery made on the one side must correspond to a parallel discovery on the other."<sup>17</sup> This means that for every assertion of experimental psychology a corresponding eidetic assertion can be found.

16. *Idées directrices*, p. 74; cf. *Ideen*, p. 49, *Ideas*, p. 89.

17. "Nachwort zu meinen Ideen," p. 556; cf. *Ideas*, p. 15.

We are here very far from the idea of an eidetic psychology which by reflection alone would give us the principles of any possible psychological process and which would pass from the particular case of a real mental activity to that of other men as well. We are far from the idea of a philosophical psychology which would determine not the real but the whole range of the possibly human. It is human reality which now emerges as *the locus of the Wesensschau*. It is in becoming conscious of myself as I am that I am able to see essences, and in this context the real and the possible are not distinct.

Husserl even came to say that "intentional psychology already carries the transcendent within itself."<sup>18</sup> This really means that there cannot be any basic discord between the point of view of psychology and that of phenomenology. It is always the same subject, man, that is being approached in one way or the other. Our image of man may be acquired with all the presuppositions of an empirical psychology, which takes him as situated within the chains of worldly causality. But this empirical psychology, if it really pays attention to what it is describing, will always end by making room for a different perspective which sees man not as a mere part of the world but as the bearer of reflection. Thus the interpenetration of psychology and phenomenology—their reciprocal envelopment—is clearly indicated in these texts as well as in those I have previously cited.

Certain formulae of Sartre, therefore, in the last chapter of his small book, *L'Imagination*, where he tries to define the thought of Husserl, definitely stand in need of correction. Sartre writes here as if phenomenological, or eidetic, psychology ought to come *first* and ought to rule over all the fundamental questions. Then after we have learned something about all possible psychic processes in general, experience may show us the actual facts. But in the basic intention of Husserl, the relation of these two approaches is not merely one of simple succession, as if one could see essences without any factual experience or could come to the facts without implying, in his very approach, a certain vision of essence. Sartre writes:

18. Based on the French translation by Gabrielle Peiffer and Emmanuel Levinas, *Méditations cartésiennes* (Paris: Armand Colin, 1931), p. 126. Cf. the English translation by Dorion Cairns, *Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology* (New York: Humanities Press, 1964), p. 147.

After one has determined the various conditions that a psychic state must necessarily possess if it is to be an image, then only may we pass from the certain to the probable, and ask of experience what it can teach us about the images which are actually present in a contemporary human consciousness.<sup>19</sup>

What is perhaps the most important aspect of Husserl's whole project is lacking in this statement.

As a matter of fact, Sartre himself does not follow the rule that he here lays down. Although he presents empirical psychology as the servant of phenomenology, he says, nevertheless, that he embarks on the study of emotion "without waiting for the phenomenology of emotion to be completed."<sup>20</sup> This means that basically experimental studies, like those of Janet, Lewin, and the psychoanalysts, must already reveal to us, at least in a confused way, the essence of that with which they are concerned. However it may be with his formulations, Sartre actually understands the relation between psychology and phenomenology in the way which I have just now tried to explain.

When he departs from this, he is led to artificial distinctions. For example, his book *L'Imaginaire*<sup>21</sup> follows this simple plan: Part I, "The Certain"; Part II, "The Probable." In the first part he gives a phenomenological analysis of the essence of the image. In the second, he turns to the data of experience with the understanding that what has been acquired in the first part is unshakable and certain, while what is now coming is only probable. But when one reads the work carefully, one finds that certain results of the first part are actually called in question in the second. At the beginning of his book, for example, Sartre shows that the image is defined by its deception and by the fact that it is unobservable and empty. When I try to imagine the Pantheon, I believe that I see it. But if I try to count the pillars, I find that I cannot do so, which means that basically I do not see anything at all. The initial phenomenological analysis determines the essence of the image as a false presence, as a nothing which tries to present itself as a something.

19. *L'Imagination*, p. 143; English translation, p. 131.

20. *Esquisse d'une théorie des émotions* (Paris: Hermann, 1939), p. 17. Cf. the English translation by Philip Mairet, *Sketch for a Theory of the Emotions* (London: Methuen, 1962), p. 29.

21. Sartre, *L'Imaginaire* (Paris: Gallimard, 1940); English translation by Bernard Frechtman, *Psychology of the Imagination* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948).

But in the second part of the book this fundamental definition of the image is placed in question when the author analyzes certain states where a clear distinction between the perceived and the imaginary cannot be made. If the image were nothing but what was first said—empty and absent—we would never confuse it with a perception, and illusions would be hard to understand. Thus in so far as Sartre raises the question of illusions in the second part, he necessarily suggests the possibility of a situation anterior to the clear distinction between perception and imagination which was made at the start. He does this, and with good reason. But this means that it is impossible to understand the image by an examination of the pure possibility of an image in general and by a definition which we would then merely apply to the analogous empirical examples.

These remarks have a certain importance because they will enable us to reply to a certain objection often made against phenomenologists—namely, that they represent a new type of scholasticism. This means that phenomenological research remains purely verbal. In this view, eidetic intuition would consist in reflecting on the meaning of certain words in use, like the word “image” or the word “emotion,” and then in developing this meaning with the firm conviction of reaching the things themselves. This complaint is not well founded if one refers to what Husserl actually intended. But there are certain formulae of Max Scheler which merit this reproach. For example, Scheler says that the intuition of essences is absolutely indubitable for a rather simple reason: because, by definition, experience can never contradict such an intuition. If experience should show me an image which does not correspond to what I have determined to be the essence, then of course, by definition, this is not an image. In the same way I may lay down a certain idea of social process. Then if I find a so-called process in everyday history or in the past which does not possess the essential characteristics I have focused, I have the right to say that it is not a social process. Here we are certainly close to scholasticism. If one had followed this principle in practice, the whole of phenomenology would be an instrument for developing the definitions of words.

But Husserl never thought in this way, and he was fully aware of the danger. Since his early article on “*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*,” he maintained that there was nothing in common between intuition, as he understood it, and a scholas-

tic process which “pretends to draw a real knowledge of things from the analytic judgment that one can make on the meanings of words.”<sup>22</sup> Husserl was, therefore, well aware of the danger of self-deception in proceeding by “eidetic intuition.” It is possible for me to believe that I am seeing an essence when, in fact, it is not an essence at all but merely a concept rooted in language, a prejudice whose apparent coherence reduces merely to the fact that I have become used to it through habit. The best way of guarding against this danger would be to admit that, though a knowledge of facts is never sufficient for grasping an essence and though the construction of “idealizing fictions” is always necessary, I can never be sure that my vision of an essence is anything more than a prejudice rooted in language—if it does not enable me to hold together all the facts which are known and which may be brought into relation with it. Failing this, it may not be an essence at all but only a prejudice. I believe that the logic of things ought to have led Husserl to admit a very close relation between induction, as he understood it, and *Wesensschau*, and consequently a final homogeneity among the different psychologies, whether they be inductive or phenomenological. I have already said that Husserl never explicitly stated this. But at least he was well aware of the necessity of defending phenomenology against verbalism. Also, after he renounced the dogmatic solution of an “apodictic evidence” which would enable us from the very start to transcend language, he was obliged, as we shall see, to reconsider the imaginary “variation” of anthropological experience as the way toward eidetic intuition.

Husserl consistently rejected the different psychologies which developed in his time, including Gestalt psychology, which had been created by writers familiar with his teaching and influenced by him. In his “*Nachwort*,” Husserl declared that it makes no difference in principle whether one conceives of consciousness as a totality or as a sum of psychic atoms, since even this totality of the Gestaltists is just another thing and therefore not a consciousness.

In his *Principles of Gestalt Psychology*, Koffka replied to this criticism in an interesting way. “A theory like mine,” he said, “seems to imply an extreme psychologism, the idea that all logical relations and subsistents can be explained by existing rela-

22. “*Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft*,” p. 305; cf. “*Philosophy as Rigorous Science*,” p. 95.

tions in the domain of psychology or physiology." Gestalt theory admits that all structures of consciousness finally depend on physiological processes of the same form ("isomorphic") as their causal foundation. This would seem to imply a position of extreme psychologism, since the whole order of meanings would seem to rest on the order of natural events. But Koffka is saying here that in a psychology like his there is a new way of describing consciousness which avoids the opposed difficulties of both psychologism and logicism. The description of "psychic process" in terms of structure should give basic satisfaction to philosophy in vindicating the order of meanings.

Koffka developed this idea in the following words:

This view [of psychologism], which had gained ground at the turn of the century, was violently attacked by some of our best philosophers, notably Edmund Husserl, who claimed to have refuted it once and for all. But his arguments rested on the assumption, implicit or explicit, in all "psychologistic" theories, that psychological relations are merely factual or external. A "psychologism" based on this assumption has indeed been refuted by Husserl and other philosophers. But this refutation does not affect our psychologism—if our theory can rightly be given this name—since in our theory psychological and physiological, or rather psychophysical, processes are organized according to intrinsic or internal relations. This point can only be alluded to. It means that in our theory psychology and logic, existence and subsistence, even, to some extent, reality and truth, no longer belong to entirely different realms or universes of discourse between which no intelligible relationship exists. It is here, if anywhere, that psychology will have to prove the integrative function that we assigned to it in the first chapter.<sup>23</sup>

These remarks of Koffka go very far. Husserl's constant objection to Gestalt theory, as to all psychology, is that it fails to understand the radical and absolute originality of consciousness, which it reduces either to psychological atoms, as the older psychologists did, or to "total" structures which are nevertheless dependent on the natural order of events. But following certain suggestions of Husserl which we have cited above, we may give the following reply: If the notion of Gestalt helps us to under-

23. Kurt Koffka, *Principles of Gestalt Psychology* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1935), pp. 570-71.

stand many facts and is fruitful in the empirical order, it must have some phenomenological truth and must have something to contribute to phenomenology. We do not have to take over the physiological hypotheses of the Gestaltists, their cerebral explanations of conscious structures. We should directly consider what they say of consciousness and of the patterns of conduct. We may then see that they are calling our attention at this level, not to events that are completely external to each other, but to an internal organization which makes the notions of value and meaning come to life. This is enough to show that the Gestalt theory is not merely a new variety of psychologism. It is rather a way of showing that conscious phenomena are both temporal (for they happen in time and occur at a definite moment) and yet at the same time internally significant, so that they can support a certain kind of knowledge and truth.

In other words, I believe that to give weight to his eidetic intuition and to distinguish it sharply from verbal concepts, Husserl was really seeking, largely unknown to himself, a notion like that of the Gestaltists—the notion of an order of meaning which does not result from the application of spiritual activity to an external matter. It is, rather, a spontaneous organization beyond the distinction between activity and passivity, of which the visible patterns of experience are the symbol. In Gestalt psychology everything bears a meaning. There is no psychic phenomenon which is not oriented toward a certain significance. It is really a psychology founded on the idea of intentionality. But this sense, which inhabits all psychic phenomena, is not produced by a pure activity of the spirit. It is, rather, an earthy and aboriginal sense, which constitutes itself by an organization of the so-called elements.

This, perhaps, might have been the occasion for Husserl to recognize a certain truth in the "integrating psychology" of Koffka. By entering into the region of facts and clarifying some of them, it has at the same time glimpsed certain essential, philosophical truths without knowing or willing this—just as Galileo, who had no intention of working out an eidetic of the *res extensa*, actually did, in his experimental work, lay the foundations for this eidetic.

## [3] THE SCIENCES OF MAN ACCORDING TO HUSSERL

IN HUSSERL'S THINKING concerning linguistics and history, we observe a development of the way in which he focused the problem, which is quite similar to what happened to his conception of psychology and which, in fact, sheds light upon the latter. In what follows, our aim will not be to repeat everything that Husserl said about linguistics and history but rather to apply his thoughts on these subjects to the clarification of psychology.

1. *Linguistics*

At the beginning of his studies, like the grammarians of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, he proposed to phenomenology the task of establishing a universal grammar by an apprehension of the essence of language. Just as we need an eidetic psychology which will determine the essences of the different regions of psychic activity, so also we need an eidetic of language which will enumerate and describe those "forms of meaning" without which no language is possible. The grammarian will never be able really to engage in the study of languages without going through this eidetic. We speak German, Husserl says, and when we embark on the study of a foreign language, we tend to understand this language from a German point of view. We conceive of its grammar and its categories in relation to those of the German language.

But if we wish to gain a truly adequate understanding of a foreign mode of speech, we must not proceed in this way. First of all, we must perform a reduction on all the presuppositions of our native tongue, in order to isolate the fundamental articulations of language itself, without which no language is possible. It is only on the basis of this universal grammar that we will be able to think through the different languages in their specificity, by reconstructing their inner patterns. We must study, Husserl says, such basic forms as categorical propositions with their primitive specifications, complex conjunctive and disjunctive propositions, and the ways of expressing universality, particularity, and singularity. It is only by keeping these fundamental

operations in view that we will be able to ask how the German language, the Chinese, etc., express "the" proposition of existence, "the" categorical proposition, "the" hypothetical premise, "the" plural, and "the" different modalities of the possible.

Husserl goes on to say:

We cannot evade the question as to whether the grammarian will be content with his own personal and prescientific views, or with the confused empirical representations provided by a particular historical grammar, like Latin, of the forms of signification. Is he following such feeble guides? Or does he have in view the pure system of linguistic patterns in a scientifically determined and theoretically coherent form—that is to say, in the form of our theory of patterns of signification? <sup>24</sup>

The eidetic of language should therefore be established at the very beginning. The empirical study of language should come afterward, directing itself to the relevant facts, clarifying them, and then reconstructing them in the light of the essences already determined.

At the beginning of his career, Husserl thought that we could bypass our mother tongue in reflecting on language as such, thus penetrating to the essences which belong necessarily to any possible language. After this, we might then understand our own peculiar ways of speaking as special cases of this universal language. This mode of approach is interesting, because it involves a dogmatic conception of the *Wesensschau*. With respect to such a conception the following question at once arises: Do we have at our disposal the means of detaching ourselves from the historical roots of the language we speak, so that we can penetrate directly to the essence of language in general?

To arrive at this universal, rational grammar, is it sufficient merely to reflect on the language which we already speak and possess, or is it essential that we should first make contact with other languages? Is language an instrument that we may directly objectivize and dominate by the *Wesensschau*, which will give us a reliable knowledge of its necessary and universal structure? Or is it not true, rather, that we gain access to the

24. "Untersuchung der Unterschied der selbstständigen und unselbstständigen Bedeutungen und die Idee der reinen Grammatik," *Logische Untersuchungen*, II, 339. Cf. Fourth Investigation, "The Distinction between Independent and Nonindependent Meanings and the Idea of Pure Grammar," *Logical Investigations*, II, 526.

universal structure of language only by first learning other languages and by coexisting with them?

Can we order the universal functions of language in a table of canonical forms that any language must possess to be a language? Or is it not true, rather, that we gain access to what different languages have in common only by grasping something of their total power of expression, without being able to make certain forms of one correspond to forms of the other, without seeing them all in the light of one single, universal language?

This question is exactly parallel to the one which we raised in our consideration of psychology. When Husserl laid it down that all empirical research must be preceded by an eidetic intuition of what an image is, what a perception is or in general by the apprehension of a pure essence, we raised the question of whether we could arrive at such conceptions without recourse to the facts. And since Husserl himself conceived of his eidetic intuition as an *experience*, a constatation, we then raised further questions concerning the relation between this contact with the facts, which is realized in science, and the sovereign insight which enables us to grasp essences through the facts in which they are incarnate.

At the beginning of his investigations, Husserl seems to absorb all facts into a universe of thought which determines every psychological possibility, as it should be determined, before any serious reference to empirical psychology. But here, as elsewhere, Husserl was not able, and finally did not wish, to defend a *dualism* between the experimental (scientific) knowledge of facts and philosophical reflection.

As his thought developed, his conception of the relation between language and reflection changed profoundly. At the beginning, there is a way of thought which detaches itself from concrete language and constructs a table of all linguistic possibilities. But as he advanced, our reflection on language appeared to him less and less an operation by which we may bypass concrete languages to arrive at a pure, universal essence, of which each empirical mode of speech is only a possible instance. This reflection becomes less and less a sovereign thinking, owing nothing to the facts. The a priori of language (what one finds by reflecting on it) is less and less a "general and rational grammar."

In an issue of the *Revue internationale de philosophie de-*

voted to Husserl, H. J. Pos<sup>25</sup> showed that, according to the last conceptions of Husserl, reflecting on language no longer means to depart from it in order to arrive at a thought which will completely envelop and possess it. To reflect on language is, rather, to recover an experience which is anterior to the objectivizing of language and certainly anterior to the scientific observation of it. In this experience the subject, who speaks and writes, passes beyond language only by exercising it and by taking it over.

According to Pos, there is a fundamental difference between the philosopher, or the phenomenologist, who reflects on language and the scholar who knows language objectively, according to the documents which are there before him. The phenomenologist tries to recover an awareness of what a speaking subject really is. He is certainly not in the attitude of a learned observer who is confronting something external to him. This observer, for example, may be considering the state of the French language at the time when I am speaking and may be showing how this is explained by some preceding state. He is thus relating the present to the past. But the speaking subject is not concerned with the past. Most of those who are presently speaking French know nothing of etymology or of the linguistic past which has made possible the language they are speaking. And the linguists themselves admit that this is explained not by its historical origins but rather by actual usage. The speaking subject is turned toward the future. Language for him is above all a means of expression and of communicating to others his intentions, which are also turned toward the future.

The observer also has a strong tendency to analyze into a series of processes which he regards as relatively independent of one another. He will show how such and such a French turn of phrase goes back to a certain origin and how other parts of the French system go back to other origins. He may even show, as a result of such analysis, how the unity of a given language breaks down. Thus there is no precise moment in history when Latin ceases and French begins. There is no such moment at which one can reasonably say: here is the frontier between Latin and French. There is no rigorous procedure which will

25. H. J. Pos, "Phénoménologie et linguistique," *Revue internationale de philosophie*, I (1939), 354-65.

enable us to determine the exact beginning of a linguistic reality. It has no precise spatial and temporal limits.

Similarly if we look within a given language, we find different dialects which are compatible with its unity but whose limits are extremely vague. If one defines Provençal by a certain number of words, turns of phrase, forms of expression, etc., there is no moment when all these are in use equally and at once, no determinate place where Provençal as a whole is perfectly realized. Between the regions where it is dominant and those where it does not prevail there are always zones of transition.

This led Vendryes<sup>26</sup> to say that a language can never be identified as a reality. It is, rather, "an ideal which never succeeds in being realized." We may say that it is in the air *between* the speaking subjects but never fully realized in any of them. From the point of view of the observer, therefore, there is reason for doubting the reality of different languages. And as we have seen, Vendryes conceded some truth to the idea that there is only one single language, since there is no way of finding the precise limit where one passes to another.

But for the subject who is actually speaking, who is no longer an *observer* confronting language as an *object*, his language is undoubtedly a distinct reality. There are regions where he can make himself understood and others where he cannot. For him it means something to be speaking French. The circumstances may be more or less precise, more or less rigorous, more or less complex, depending on the culture of the speaker. But for him there is always a moment, a boundary, beyond which he no longer understands and is no longer understood.

These two points of view are different. And according to Pos, the most distinctive idea in Husserl's thought about language at the end of his life is that the chief task of linguistic philosophy, or phenomenology, is to regain an awareness of the speaking subject. He moved far from the old text of the *Logical Investigations*, to which I have just referred. There is no longer any question of making us leap beyond language into a universe of thought in which it would be included as a particular sector. Reflection on language now consists not in returning to a transcendental subject, disengaged from all actual linguistic

26. Joseph Vendryes, *Le Langage: Introduction linguistique à l'histoire* (Paris: Renaissance du Livre, 1921); English translation by Paul Radin, *Language: A Linguistic Introduction to History* (New York: Knopf, 1925).

situations, but to a speaking subject who has no access to any truth nor to any thought with a claim to universality except through the practice of his language in a definite linguistic situation.

Husserl's change of mind on this point is linked with the maturing of his whole philosophy. In our thinking we do not find in particular phenomena, such as language, a consciousness which can dispose, in an explicit fashion, of all that is necessary to constitute itself. We must, rather, become aware of this paradox—that we never free ourselves from the particular except by taking over a situation that is all at once, and inseparably, both limitation and access to the universal. There is no longer any question of constructing a logic of language, a universal grammar, but rather of finding a logic already incorporated in the word. Husserl was saying of language what he also said of other sectors of his philosophy, that the most profound reflection consists in rediscovering a basic faith, or opinion (*Urglaube, Urdoxa*)—that is, a reason which is already incorporated in sensible phenomena. It seemed to him that to reflect on language is to clarify the activity of the speaking subject, to find a reason already incorporated in these means of expression, this language which I know because I am it.

This is why, in his last unedited writings, Husserl found a much deeper significance in the problem of language. In *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, published during his lifetime, he already expressly indicated that to speak is not at all to *translate a thought into words*. It is rather to *see a certain object by the word*.

The intention of signifying [*Meinung*] is not found outside the words, or at their side. It is rather the case that, in speaking, I constantly achieve an internal fusion of the intention with the words. This intention, we may say, animates the words, and as a result all the words, and indeed each word, incarnate an intention; and once incarnated, they bear this in themselves as their meaning.<sup>27</sup>

The relation of language to thought is here comparable to that of the body to consciousness, a problem with which Husserl

27. *Formale und transzendente Logik* (Halle: Niemeyer, 1929), p. 20; cf. English translation by Dorion Cairns, *Formal and Transcendental Logic* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), § 3, p. 22.

was always preoccupied. At the beginning of his career, he insisted on the fact that this relation was purely external. When I reflect on consciousness, I find it pure. But when I think about man—that is, consciousness linked to a body—I must perform what he called an “apperception.” This means that I must seize this consciousness not as it truly is in itself but only as it is causally linked to a certain object which I call “the body.” Thus according to this first conception, my relation to another person consists only in conceiving, or “apperceiving,” back of the body-object a thinker who is not mixed with this body and is not altered by being joined to it. But as Husserl’s thought matured—for example, in the *Cartesian Meditations*, written much later—his conception of the relation of one person to another and of consciousness to the body became much more profound.

In the *Cartesian Meditations* the experience of the other is like something taught me by the spontaneity of my body. It is as if my body learns what my consciousness cannot, for this body takes the actions of the other into account, realizes a sort of coupling with them, or an “intentional transgression,” without which I would never gain the notion of the other as other. Thus the body is not only an object to which my consciousness finds itself externally linked. For me it is the only way of knowing that there are other animated bodies, which also means that its own link with my consciousness is more internal and essential.

The same is true of language. Consciousness of language is no longer the separated foundation of a language, which is secondary to it and derived. To know what language is, it is necessary first of all to speak. It no longer suffices to reflect on the languages lying before us in historical documents of the past. It is necessary to take them over, to live with them, to speak them. It is only by making contact with this speaking subject that I can get a sense of what other languages are and can move around in them.

This explains why it is that finally, in the unpublished texts of Husserl—that on *The Origin of Geometry*,<sup>28</sup> for example—he admitted that the problem of language is fundamental, if one wishes to gain any true clarity on the existence of ideas and

28. Since published. See “Die Frage nach dem Ursprung der Geometrie als intentional-historisches Problem,” *Revue internationale de philosophie*, I (1939), 203–25; English translation by David Carr, “The Origin of Geometry,” in *The Crisis of European Sciences*, Appendix VI, pp. 353–78.

cultural objects in the actual world. We must recognize that what we call “ideas” are carried into the world of existence by their instruments of expression—books, museums, musical scores, writings. If we wish to understand how the phenomenon of “ideal existence” is possible for a number of subjects, who do not live at the same time, to participate in the same ideas, we must first understand how the thoughts of one single subject are incorporated in the cultural instruments which convey them outside and make them accessible to others.

I do not wish to elaborate here on the problem of the origin of language in its ideal existence, as founded on external expression and on the public document, although I am perfectly clear that a radical clarification of the mode of being of ideal complexes finds here its last condition.<sup>29</sup>

We are far from the initial position of the *Logical Investigations*, where the existence of a given, particular language was founded on ideal existence, a universal grammar, the essence of language. Here the possibility of an ideal existence and of communication between particular subjects is finally founded on the act of speaking as it is realized in writing or in the spoken word. There is no longer any question of starting with a universal language which would furnish the invariable plan of any possible mode of speech, and of then proceeding to the analysis of particular languages. It is exactly the reverse. The language which is present, actual, and effective becomes the model for understanding other possible modes of speech. It is in our experience of the speaking subject that we must find the germ of universality which will enable us to understand other languages.

There is no doubt, I believe, that Husserl was here approaching certain insights of contemporary linguistics, especially that of Saussure. This return to the speaking subject, which Husserl called the phenomenology of language, is required not only for philosophic thought but for linguistics itself, as Saussure conceived of it. To deal with given languages objectively is not enough. We must study the subject who is actually speaking. To the linguistic of language we must add the linguistic of the word. This convergence of the thought of Husserl and Saussure is relevant to what I was saying above concerning the relation be-

29. *Ibid.*, p. 210; cf. English translation, p. 358.

tween psychology and phenomenology—namely, that there is agreement, not opposition, between the immanent development of the sciences of man and that of phenomenology. This agreement promises us a solution of problems concerning the relation between these sciences and philosophy. As his thinking developed, Husserl was led to link more and more what he had at first sharply separated—the possible and the actual, essence and existence. This movement corresponds to the evolution of the human sciences, in so far as they are tending to free themselves from those scientific and positivistic postulates which perhaps favored their beginnings but which are now retarding their further development.

## 2. *History*

Here again, at the beginning Husserl affirmed the necessity of an eidetic of history, an a priori science which would determine the real meaning of a number of concepts historians use blindly and without careful examination. One cannot learn what a “social process” or a “religion” is simply by doing empirical history and by being a historian. It is certainly clear that, in so far as these historians have not clarified the sense of the words they are using, they themselves do not know what it is they are talking about. If it aims to show that historical work must define the categories, or essences, implied in it, this remark is sound.

Take, for example, Durkheim’s famous investigation of totemism in his *Formes élémentaires de la vie religieuse*. He asked himself how one should understand the phenomenon of the sacred as it is found in Australian totemism. Having shown that, in the tribes considered, the experience of the sacred occurs at moments devoted to totemic celebrations and at annual reunions when social bonds are strongest, he thought he could draw the conclusion that in general the sacred is an expression of the social. Since the sacred is an essential element in religion, he also concluded that religion in general is the social.

It is of course true that definitions are free and that Durkheim had the right to call the social, and the sacred, religious. But in giving the title *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life* to his book, he implied something more. He meant to say that the phenomena studied by him (Australian totemism) are *elementary*—that is, they reveal the elements, or the essence, of reli-

gion in such a way that every particular religion must be considered as a variation on this theme. With respect to a postulate of this kind, the demands of Husserl seem to be justified. Even if this study of the sacred in Australian totemism were itself incontestable, the question of whether the sacred is the “elementary,” or essential, religious phenomenon would still be left open. There are many religious phenomena which are more rich and more varied than Australian totemism. Must we believe that they are mere superstructures based on the sacred as it is experienced by these tribes? This cannot be postulated, and it is precisely the object of Husserl’s questions to obtain such a clarification. What is a religion, or what is the essence of religion? If it really is the sacred, then Durkheim may draw his universal conclusion. But if the sacred is only a lateral, or derived, phenomenon, always present but never having the same sense in different religions, then Durkheim’s investigations do not authorize the general conclusion he wished to draw from them.

There is, therefore, something well founded in this idea of Husserl that contact with the facts is not enough to determine, for example, whether we ought to distinguish between “religion as an idea and religion as a cultural form.” History shows cultural forms to which we give the name “religion,” but from the variety, confusion, and incoherence of these phenomena, as they are given, should we conclude that they can still be analyzed? Or should we wait for another possible experience that would be not only religious but also pure religion? This question cannot be answered by a mere examination of the facts. It requires reflection on the essence of religion, as well as a phenomenology of history. In the same way history shows us that Egyptian art is such and such, that Greek art is this and that. But on this basis one cannot come to any legitimate conclusion concerning the universal forms of all possible art. We must begin by reflecting on what art is, on what it can be—which is again a determination of essence. History also shows us a number of juridical systems. But according to Husserl the investigation of relevant historical facts in which just law is manifested remains “confused,” unless one has determined what just law is, in principle, by a reflection that is not of the empirical order.

Husserl first said, in brief, that history is unable to judge an idea. It is true that there are historians who write as if the ideas are being judged by the facts. The reciting of events or

the analysis of institutions seems by itself to show that a certain ideal pattern, such as religion or monarchy, either is or is not coherent, either depends or does not depend on a chance coincidence. But in reality, Husserl said, the history which sets up values and judges arrives at these values not in the facts but in an ideal sphere. It involves a latent phenomenology which is not expressed and which is, therefore, probably incorrect. In his first conception the hierarchy is very clear. There is a reflection on historical possibilities which is autonomous and independent of any knowledge of historical facts.

The conception of historicity which Husserl constructed at the beginning of his career resulted directly from this principle. He found among his contemporaries certain philosophers who were concerned to remain in close touch with the present. They accepted the *Weltanschauung* conception of Dilthey. According to them, philosophy is not a type of knowledge which develops with absolute certainty outside time. At each moment it should be, rather, a conscious grasp of what is sound in the scientific results already acquired as well as a synthesis of these, which must be provisional, approximative, and only probable. In his article "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft" Husserl took a stand against the position of these philosophers. He did this in a manner which was decisive but also carefully shaded.

He began by declaring that Dilthey and the *Weltanschauung* philosophy were certainly responding to a *legitimate need*—that of deciding in a single lifetime to live in the light of reflection and to arrive in this way at effective, practical conclusions. This philosophy, he said, has a firm grasp of the truth that we have an end in the finite, since our lives are limited and we have to govern them. It would be nonsense to deny these responsibilities. In a unique life there must be a method of constant approximation rather than practical, apodictic certainties. Morality would lose its meaning if it were emptied of its essential finitude. Moral man must arrive at judgments and, in any case, at acts which imply judgments. Similarly it is necessary for him to orient himself in the world and at each moment to have a conception of the world, even though scientific philosophy, which is certain and rigorous, is not yet fully developed.

Only, Husserl adds, this practical necessity of answering problems of existence is not a sufficient justification for the conception of philosophy as a *Weltanschauung* that is merely prob-

able. A truly rigorous philosophy would give an answer to the problems of the time. It would construct the idea of our time, and would think this time through just as well as, or even better than, the others. As a consequence, precisely in being *philosophia perennis*, it would be the philosophy of the present. If under the pretext that this philosophy is not yet on hand, one turns from it and abandons it for the sake of a *Weltanschauung*, one weakens true philosophy and postpones the solution of the problems posed. Therefore we should not look to wisdom but to philosophy, not to a mere view of the world (*Weltanschauung*) but to the science of the world (*Weltwissenschaft*). So Husserl decided against these philosophers of *Weltanschauung*, who are able to struggle but never to gain a decisive solution. According to him, they "place their end in the finite. They wish to have their system, and then enough time to live in accordance with it."<sup>30</sup>

Husserl, therefore, recognized that the problems posed by the present are legitimate, and he never said that philosophy ought to abandon them. But he thought that it could not arrive at these problems of life except by the way of an absolute knowledge. If *de jure* philosophical research is not remote from the present, at least *de facto* it is, and since it requires much time and all our human powers, it should become in itself a way of existing and not a mere preparation for life, as it was for Dilthey. Thus Husserl never denied that the philosopher experiences the need of thinking through and of judging his time, in so far as he has to live an individual life. But he did not want to sacrifice the least element of philosophical rigor to present exigencies. Hence he conceded, as a consequence he had not wished but had to accept, that philosophers should not have any deeply motivated opinion on present affairs, if at this price they could contribute to the founding of a truly rigorous philosophy which eventually would be a total philosophy and, therefore, also a philosophy of the present.

We must here remember that even at the beginning Husserl never chose eternity as against time. He never said that philosophical existence was absolute. He said only that, since philosophy demands an unlimited effort, if we wish it to be truly rigorous and truly a philosophy, we must sell neither it nor our powers to our time. As a matter of fact, Husserl knew that

30. "Philosophie als strenge Wissenschaft," p. 338; cf. "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," p. 143 (see note 15, above).

philosophy had eaten up the whole of his life, and he never complained. But he never thought that philosophy was the whole of life.

Afterward he perceived that philosophical activity cannot be defined as reflection concerned with essences, as opposed to practical activity concerned with existence. In order to see things more clearly than he had been able to see them in the past, what was of primary importance now seemed to him to be historicity. When one reflects and thinks things through to the very end, one will not necessarily arrive at eternal truths. By the purest thought one will, rather, discover an intelligible becoming of ideas, a "generation of meaning" (*Sinn-genesis*). In the last analysis, cultural realities are of such a nature that we cannot reflect on them without discovering in the sense of these notions a "sedimented history." It may be the theorem of Pythagoras; it may be the more modern conceptions of geometry in the nineteenth century. When we reflect on these ideas it may seem to us, at our first view, that we have arrived at invariable elements, always the same in all thinking for all men who have lived or ever will live.

But after regarding them more carefully, we perceive that Euclidean geometry includes ideas, of course, but ideas that have a date. Nineteenth-century geometry takes them over but defines them otherwise and finally considers Euclidean space as a special case of one that is more general. This means that in spite of its apparent lucidity and its air of eternity, Euclidean space was not self-evident. Until the time of the non-Euclidean geometries, it was not entirely penetrated by the spirit but included a certain coefficient of contingency. It was, after all, a cultural formation which included finite and "naïve" elements linked to a certain temporal state of knowledge. Hence while it did not have to be destroyed or discounted by what came after, it had to be at least completed, elaborated, and sublimated by later geometric conceptions. Thus when we reflect even on geometric notions, we discover a historical becoming. As Plato said long ago, we discover that the ideas are not at rest.

If this is true, where, then—if we may speak in this way—is the place of philosophy? It is evidently not in the event; nor is it in the eternal. It is in a history which is not the sum of these events placed end to end, since they force each other out of existence. But this history is thinkable, comprehensible. It offers

us an order, a sense to which I do not have to submit but which I can place in perspective. Husserl called this an "intentional history." Others have called it "dialectic." This is why we find terms in the later writings of Husserl that he would not have thought of employing at the beginning, such as "the European sciences." He came to see an essential value in the historical development of European philosophy and science which must be continued. Certain notions cannot be attained except by a series of successive steps and by a sedimentation of meaning which makes it impossible for the new sense to appear before its time and apart from certain factual conditions. Of course, this knowledge is universal, and there is no question of restricting it to those who have brought it forth or of limiting it to European forms of existence. In order to surmount the crisis it is going through, it must be rendered universal in fact, as it is in right. Certainly nothing was more foreign to Husserl than a European chauvinism. For him European knowledge would maintain its value only by becoming capable of understanding what is not itself.

What is new in the later writings is that to think philosophically, to be a philosopher, is no longer to leap from existence to essence, to depart from facticity in order to join the idea. To think philosophically, to be a philosopher—in relation to the past, for example—is to understand this past through the internal link between it and us. Comprehension thus becomes a coexistence in history, which extends not only to our contemporaries but also to Plato, to what is back of us, and to what is before us and far distant. Philosophy is the taking over of cultural operations begun before our time and pursued in many different ways, which we now "reanimate" and "reactivate" from the standpoint of our present. Philosophy lives from this power of *interesting* ourselves in everything that has been and is attempted in the order of knowledge and of life, and of finding a sharable sense in it, as if all things were present to us through our present. The true place of philosophy is not time, in the sense of discontinuous time, nor is it the eternal. It is rather the "living present" (*lebendige Gegenwart*)—that is, the present in which the whole past, everything foreign, and the whole of the thinkable future are reanimated.

So far as historical investigations are concerned, we can now see that at the end of his life Husserl came to have a very differ-

ent idea of them from that which he had at the beginning. He now saw in historical and ethnographic facts a value, a significance, a power of teaching that he had not seen before.

He admitted from the beginning that history can teach something to the philosopher; it can lead him to the objective spirit (*Gemeingeist*).<sup>31</sup> He had already indicated that a historian who criticizes a phenomenon—like “Christianity” or “monarchy,” for example—showing that these are nothing but names given to series of incoherent facts lacking any essential unity, is already beginning a work of reflection and doing philosophy without knowing it. All criticism, he said, is the inverse side of a positive affirmation. Consequently, every historical criticism involves a systematic intuition which must be brought into the light. Hence he was prepared to grant, at this early stage of his career, that there was a confused intuition of essence in concrete historical research. Later on he conceded more explicitly that contact with historical or ethnological facts is not only suggestive but even indispensable for any true apprehension of the possible.

It is important to note the extraordinary interest aroused in Husserl by his reading of Lévy-Bruhl's *Primitive Mythology* [*Mythologie primitive*], which seems rather remote from his ordinary concerns. What interested him here was the contact with an alien culture, or the impulse given by this contact to what we may call his philosophical imagination. Before this, Husserl had maintained that a mere imaginative variation of the facts would enable us to conceive of every possible experience we might have. In a letter to Lévy-Bruhl which has been preserved, he seems to admit that the facts go beyond what we imagine and that this point bears a real significance. It is as if the imagination, left to itself, is unable to represent the possibilities of existence which are realized in different cultures.

It is a task of the highest importance, which may be actually achieved, to feel our way into a humanity whose life is enclosed in a vital, social tradition, and to understand it in this unified social life. This is the basis of the world which is no mere representation [*Weltvorstellung*] but rather the world that actually is for it [*sondern die für sie wirklich seiende Welt ist*].<sup>32</sup>

31. *Ibid.*, p. 328; cf. English translation, p. 129.

32. The letter is in the Husserl Archives at Louvain.

Husserl was struck by the contact which Lévy-Bruhl had established, through his book, with the actual experience of primitive man. Having made this contact with the author's aid, he now saw that it is perhaps not possible for us, who live in certain historical traditions, to conceive of the historical possibility of these primitive men by a mere variation of our imagination. For these primitives are nonhistorical (*Geschichtlos*). There are certain “stagnant” societies, as they are sometimes called, in which our conception of history is simply absent. Life for them is only a present which is constantly renewed and simply succeeds itself. How is it possible for a German, born in the nineteenth century in a milieu (*Umwelt*) which is not fixed but in a world which has a national past to be realized and a future partly realized, to know this by mere imagination? If one is born into a culture which is structured by historical time, by an ancient past that has now arrived and a future becoming past, how will he represent “a life that is only a flowing present” (*strömende Gegenwart*)?

He will have to reconstitute the lived experience and the actual milieu of the primitive man. The merit of Lévy-Bruhl's work is that it revived this milieu, the environment of the primitive man. Civilizations like ours grant that men of the past had a future in view and that all these futures have come to a present in which they are sedimented. We now have the impression that we also are oriented toward a future which will take over what is good as well as what is bad in our present and, through this, in the life of our predecessors, perhaps giving them a sense which they did not have before or, on the contrary, remaining faithful to them. Whether we consider our lives as a rupture with the past or as a continuation of it, there is always an internal relation between that which has been, that which is, and that which will be. This is precisely that historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) which does not exist in stagnant, or frozen, societies.

We must have an experience which is organized in such a way as to express the whole environment (*Umwelt*) of these primitive men. There must be a joining of effort between anthropology as a mere inventory of actual facts and phenomenology as a mere thinking through of possible societies. It is essential that this abstract phenomenology should come into contact with the facts, that it should work out, as Lévy-Bruhl did,

a way of animating and of organizing these facts which might convey them to the reader as they are lived by those who are actually caught up in this context.

With respect to this intentional analysis of different cultural formations, "historical relativism has its incontestable justification as an anthropological fact" (*der historische Relativismus sein zweifelloses Recht behält—als anthropologische Tatsache*). But while anthropology, together with the other positive sciences, may have the first word in the gaining of scientific knowledge, it does not have the last. Historical relativism is now no longer dominated at one stroke by a mode of thought which would have all the keys of history and would be in a position to classify all possible histories before any factual inquiry. On the contrary, the thinker who wishes to dominate history in this way must learn from the facts and must enter into them.

In order to grasp the essential structures of a human community, one must himself take into account, and relive, the whole milieu (*Umwelt*) of this society. Historical knowledge is a coexistence with the meanings of a people and not merely the solitary reflection of a historian. The eidetic of history cannot dispense with factual investigation. In the eyes of Husserl, philosophy, as a coherent thought which leads to a classification of facts according to their value and truth, continues to have its final importance. But it must begin by understanding the lived experiences.

At this point phenomenology, in Husserl's sense, rejoins phenomenology in the Hegelian sense, which consists in following man through his experiences without substituting oneself for him but rather working through them in such a way as to reveal their sense. The term "phenomenology" ends by bringing out into the open everything that is implicitly contained at the start. It was not by accident that Husserl made this choice.

#### CONCLUSION FROM HUSSERL TO HIS SUCCESSORS

THE DEVELOPMENT OF Husserl's thought, which I have tried to trace, is not a mere change of mind, a hesitation, or a zigzag. His problem, as defined in the first lecture, was to find a way between psychology and philosophy—a mode of thinking, in

short, which would be neither eternal and without root in the present nor a mere event destined to be replaced by another event tomorrow, and consequently deprived of any intrinsic value. Husserl began like all philosophers; that is, he tried to achieve a radical reflection. He tried to reflect on this power of thought which he was, and this radical reflection finally discovered, behind itself, the unreflected as the condition of its possibility, without which it would have no sense.

Reflection is historicity—on the one hand the possession of myself and on the other my insertion into a history. These two elements are not antagonistic to each other. In so far as thought matures, they become correlative. It belongs to the nature of my reflection to gain possession of myself and in consequence to free myself from determination by external conditions. But in reflecting in this way, and just because I am doing it with the purpose of escaping external temporality, I at once discover a temporality and a historicity that I am. My reflection is taken over from preceding reflections and from a movement of existence which offers itself to me. But, Husserl said, it always involves a certain degree of naïveté. It never lifts itself out of time.

For example, the relation between philosophy and the history of philosophy is reciprocal. The philosopher understands the history of philosophy by his own thoughts, and yet at the same time he understands himself in relation to the history of philosophy to which he has access as a spectacle. In short, he understands himself by the history of philosophy, and he understands this history by himself. "A relative clarification of the one side sheds some light on the other, which in its turn reflects back on the first," Husserl said in the last volume he prepared for publication. There is no doubt that he would have said of history in general just what he said here of the history of philosophy. As a result, we can say that the problem with which we were concerned at the beginning—must we be for fact or for essence, for time or eternity, for the positive science of man or philosophy?—was bypassed in the later thought of Husserl. Here he no longer considers essence as separated from fact, eternity from time, or philosophic thought from history.

It is at first rather surprising to find that in this effort to link philosophy with time and history, Husserl went much further than his successors, Max Scheler and Heidegger. They tried much

more quickly than he to incorporate irrational elements, in the traditional sense of this phrase, into philosophy. They attempted to work out an analysis not only of consciousness, the privileged domain for Husserl, but of what Scheler called "the logic of the heart" and what Heidegger called "being in the world." One would therefore expect that they would be more ready to bring philosophy down into the sphere of "facticity," as Heidegger referred to it. But in fact, when they seek to define philosophical knowledge, we find them adopting dogmatic formulae which remind us of certain earlier statements of Husserl. They seem to see no difficulties in assuming an unconditional philosophic intuition.

For example, when Scheler defines intuition of essence in his famous book on ethics,<sup>33</sup> he says that we know an essence without the slightest intervention of physical, physiological, psychological, or historical factors arising from our individuality. He maintains that, in seeing the "unities of ideal meaning," there is no need to pay any attention to these factors of particularity. They have no influence on our vision of what we take to be an essence which is, in fact, truly an essence. Husserl would have replied that an affirmation of this kind is "naïve." If I were to consider ten years afterward what had been for me ten years before an insight into essence, I would perceive that I had not been in the presence of the *things themselves* and that a number of momentary factors, such as my ruling prejudices and my particular way of existing, had entered into this so-called evidence.

In *Formal and Transcendental Logic* Husserl made it clear that every insight into essence includes "a certain degree of naïveté"—that is to say, unconsciousness. He seemed to be much more conscious, much more rigorous than Scheler, and his effort to link essence with existence is finally much more mindful of the truth than Scheler's uncritical affirmation. Scheler expresses the curious juxtaposition of a philosophy which on the one hand seeks "alogical essences" and on the other hand conceives of itself as having an unconditioned power of arriving at the truth.

This comment also applies to Heidegger, who devotes himself to the description of being in the world. One might expect, therefore, that the philosopher who finds himself thrown into the

33. *Formalism in Ethics and Nonformal Ethics of Values*, translated by Roger L. Funk and Manfred S. Frings (Evanston, Ill.: Northwestern University Press, 1973).

world might also find some difficulty in arriving at an adequate state of knowledge. But Heidegger defines the attitude of the philosopher without recognizing any restriction on the absolute power of philosophical thought. For example, at the beginning of *Sein und Zeit*,<sup>34</sup> he says that the task of philosophy is to explore the natural concept of the world, independently of science, by the primordial experience we have of it. To determine the structure of this natural world, he adds, it is not at all necessary to have any recourse to ethnology or to psychology. These disciplines presuppose a philosophical knowledge of the natural world, and one can never find the principle which will enable us to order psychological or ethnographical facts by making inductions from these facts. In order to do this, the spirit itself must first possess the principle.

We have already found this antithesis of philosophy and psychology and this same reassertion of the priority of philosophy in Husserl. But we have seen how, as his thought matured, this relation of priority gave way to one of interdependence and reciprocity. In the point which concerns us, Scheler and Heidegger remained fixed in their thesis of a pure and simple opposition between philosophy and the sciences of man or, as Heidegger put it, between the ontological and the ontic. For Husserl, as we have seen, this opposition was only a point of departure, which later became a problem, and finally a hidden connection between the two kinds of research. Husserl, who defined philosophy as the suspension of our affirmation of the world, recognized the actual being of the philosopher in the world much more clearly than Heidegger, who devoted himself to the study of being in the world.

It will not be possible for us here to reflect at length on this paradox. If we were to subject it to a close examination, we would perhaps find nothing unexpected in it. A certain form of immediate dogmatism, or rationalism, is not only reconcilable but deeply allied with irrationalism. The most effective defenders of reason in practice and even in theory are not those who abstractly make the strongest claims for it. And inversely it is quite in order that a philosopher like Husserl, who was particularly sensitive on the subject of rationality, should be more capable, precisely to

34. 3d ed. (Halle: Niemeyer, 1931), p. 45; English translation by John MacQuarrie and Edward Robinson, *Being and Time* (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 71.

this degree, of recognizing the link between reason and existence. This is because, for him, rationality is no phantom. He bears it within himself and practices it.

But let us now return to our problem. Phenomenologists, above all Husserl, have always felt that psychology was concerned with a very distinctive type of knowledge. It is not inductive in the sense which this word carries with empiricists. But neither is it reflective in the traditional philosophical sense—that is, a return to the *a priori* which would determine the form of all human experience. One may say indeed that psychological knowledge is reflection but that it is at the same time an experience. According to the phenomenologist (Husserl), it is a “material *a priori*.” Psychological reflection is a “constatation” (a finding). Its task is to discover the meaning of behavior through an effective contact with my own behavior and that of others. Phenomenological psychology is therefore a search for the essence, or meaning, but not apart from the facts. Finally this essence is accessible only in and through the individual situation in which it appears. When pushed to the limit, eidetic psychology becomes analytic-existential.

Let us now turn to the psychologists. With reference to them I propose to show that, while the phenomenologists have been working out their reflections in the ways I have just indicated, the psychologists have also been led to redefine psychological knowledge in an analogous manner. This has been due in part to the direct influence of phenomenologies, in part to a diffuse influence of which they were not conscious, and above all to the pressure of the concrete problems with which they had to deal. I propose to show in the following lectures that psychology, as we have seen it developing during the last twenty-five or thirty years, is certainly not inductive in the empiricist sense of the term. But, of course, neither is it *a priori* in the sense of a reflection which owes nothing to the contact of the psychologist himself with the facts and with the situation he is trying to clarify. Psychology is tending, rather, to rely on a disciplined reading of the phenomena which arise both in me and outside of me, and on a resulting grasp of the meaning of human behavior. If this agreement is confirmed, it should enable us to relate philosophy to psychology in such a way as to make the existence of the one compatible with that of the other.